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Abstract 
 The creation of the Public Company Oversight Board and the release of their reports on 
audit deficiencies by public accounting firms have increased the dialog about what constitutes 
sufficient audit evidence. Since the determination of what is sufficient depends largely on 
professional judgment there is no bright line rule that auditors can apply to know they have 
completed a satisfactory audit. Using theory from the organizational behavior literature I 
examine several information gathering stopping rules that may be descriptive of how auditors 
make evidence sufficiency judgments (Browne and Pitts 2004). I perform interviews with 
practicing audit professionals to investigate the difficulties auditors face when determining the 
nature and extent of audit evidence that comprises a sufficient base on which to conclude. 
Results indicate that the audit program represents a mental list of the audit firm’s collective 
knowledge against which individuals check off required audit evidence attributes. Through 
applying Bonner’s (2007) Judgment and Decision Making in Accounting Framework, I identify 
significant differences in task, environment, and person variables across real world scenarios 
where the auditors found it was either very easy or very difficult to know when sufficient audit 
evidence had been collected prior to forming a conclusion. 
 In a second study, I run an experiment that manipulates task, environment and person 
(cognitive) variables identified in Study 1 to investigate how flexible idea generation can be 
improved during audit planning. In the face of regulatory and public scrutiny, audit professionals 
and researchers alike tend to focus on improving auditor decision making by reducing judgment 
errors. Doing so can lead to increased rigidity and stagnation of the audit program mental list, 
rather than incorporating changes that reflect new additions to collective firm knowledge. An 
alternative to improving performance through focusing explicitly on error reduction is to 
iii 
encourage more insightful application of professional judgment (Klein 2013). Promoting flexible 
idea generation during the planning stage of the audit is also important because it can provide the 
unpredictability of procedures desired by regulators (AICPA 2006; PCAOB 2007; IFAC 2009) 
and can discover audit process improvements for future audits. Through application of the 
Search for Ideas in Associative Memory model (Nijstad and Stroebe 2006), I predict and find 
that priming a counterfactual mindset improves audit evidence idea generation when auditors 
perform familiar audit tasks by helping them overcome subconscious barriers created through 
repetitive use of standardized audit procedures. I also predict and find that provision of a 
suggested procedure improves audit evidence idea generation, but that priming a counterfactual 
mindset negates this benefit for auditors completing unfamiliar audit tasks. This study 
contributes to literature and practice by introducing flexible idea generation as an audit judgment 
performance measure for audit planning tasks beyond traditionally accepted fraud brainstorming 
procedures. Supplemental analyses also provide preliminary evidence that promoting flexible 
idea generation can improve audit efficiency for familiar tasks, which is indicative of flexible 
idea generation leading to audit process improvements. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 The creation of the Public Company Oversight Board (PCAOB) and its inspection 
process for public accounting firms has shone a spotlight on the concept of audit evidence 
sufficiency. According to PCAOB reports, an audit deficiency occurs when, “at the time [the 
firm] issued its audit report, it had not obtained sufficient competent evidential matter to support 
its opinion on the issuer’s financial statements” (PCAOB 2008, 7). In other words, audit 
deficiencies are the result of insufficient audit evidence collections. Auditing standards provide 
guidance as to what constitutes sufficient audit evidence. However, each auditee is unique and 
increased business complexity can result in even seemingly routine applications of sampling 
methodology requiring professional judgment (e.g., a multiple location entity with non-standard 
processes). In this thesis, I perform an exploratory interview study on evidence sufficiency 
judgments with professional auditor participants followed by an experimental study with 
interventions designed to address challenges observed in the interview study.   
 In Study 1, I apply theory related to information acquisition stopping rules in interviews 
with practicing auditors to examine what difficulties auditors encounter when attempting to 
determine whether they have obtained sufficient audit evidence. Fifteen auditors with ranks of 
Senior or In-Charge through Partner or Executive Director described, and completed brief 
surveys regarding, scenarios in which it was either very easy or very difficult for them to 
determine whether they had collected sufficient audit evidence. Browne and Pitts (2004) propose 
four different stopping rules, or information aggregation techniques, that are applicable to 
settings focused, “on the completeness or sufficiency of information obtained rather than on 
choosing between existing alternatives” (213). I find evidence that auditors prefer to use the 
Mental List stopping rule in which the auditor will assess sufficiency by comparing information 
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attained against a predetermined set of criteria. This is perhaps unsurprising given audit 
methodology structured around covering each assertion and audit programs that resemble giant 
checklists. Browne and Pitts (2004) also propose that more experienced individuals prefer the 
Mental List stopping rule, which is consistent with audit programs reflecting the collective 
experience (i.e., mental lists) of firm members. Further, I find that auditors had the most 
difficulty judging evidence sufficiency when the transaction being audited was unfamiliar to 
either the individual or the firm as a whole (i.e., no mental list was readily available). 
 Analysis of the survey responses, regarding attributes of the easy and difficult scenarios, 
through the lens of Bonner’s (2008) Judgment and Decision Making in Accounting Framework 
informs my experimental design for Study 2. In this study, I investigate factors that can improve 
auditors’ flexible idea generation regarding potential audit evidence that they might obtain. I 
examine flexible idea generation for two reasons: (1) brainstorming potential audit evidence 
provides the auditor with items from which they can build or revise a mental list; and (2) 
although the term evidence sufficiency naturally brings to mind concerns of quantity, the quality 
(i.e., type) of evidence collected can result in insufficiency as well. Using Bonner’s 
classifications of task, environment, and person variables, I focus primarily on the task variable 
of routineness (conceptually, task familiarity), the environmental variable of working paper 
similarity (conceptually, provision of an example), and the person variable of experience 
(conceptually, relevant knowledge). 
 In Study 2, I investigate auditor flexible idea generation for two reasons: (1) in the easy 
scenarios of Study 1, flexible idea generation would encourage auditors to considering whether 
there was better audit evidence available than what their existing mental list what the audit 
program required them to obtain (i.e., firm’s mental list); and (2) in the difficult scenarios 
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flexible idea generation would facilitate the application of auditors’ knowledge and experience 
with unfamiliar and unusual tasks (i.e., those without mental lists). I integrate my observations 
from Study 1 with theory on idea generation to explore how a psychological intervention, 
priming a counterfactual mindset, can allow auditors to make better use of their experience and 
access more task relevant knowledge during audit planning. Additionally, I consider whether the 
audit environmental factors of example provision (e.g., availability of a prior year working 
paper) aids or hinders idea generation, both in isolation and in conjunction with the 
counterfactual mindset prime. Using theory from the Search for Ideas in Associative Memory 
(SIAM) model I predict and find that priming a counterfactual mindset provides greater benefits 
to idea generation for familiar tasks, regardless of example presence; alternatively, example 
presence provides the greatest benefits to idea generation in unfamiliar tasks, but only in the 
absence of a counterfactual mindset (Nijstad and Stroebe 2006). 
 I organize the remainder of this dissertation as follows. Chapter II describes the exploratory 
interview Study 1. Chapter III describes the theory and hypothesis development for Study 2. 
Chapters IV and V describe the experimental method and the results for Study 2, respectively. 
Section VI provides discussion and concluding comments. 
  
4 
II. STUDY 1: EXPLORATORY INTERVIEWS 
It’s just judgment. …[I]t all comes down to judgment and your experience in 
working with the company, and it could be a different experience at a different 
company, and your risk tolerance, and your own personal experience working 
with a particular account, and…the trust you have in the competency of the client 
and the team. …[T]here’s many, many factors.  
          - Audit Partner 5 
 
 A practicing audit partner, when asked why two auditors might disagree on whether 
sufficient audit evidence had been collected for a given engagement, gave the above quote. Since 
the concept of evidence sufficiency can so easily vary from auditor to auditor, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that the PCAOB inspectors, with entirely different experiences, so often find and 
report audit deficiencies. While audit deficiencies related to quantity of evidence collected 
appear to be in decline, audit deficiencies related to the nature of evidence collected seem to 
persist (Church and Shefchik 2012). However, we know little about how auditors determine what 
evidence to obtain and how they apply professional judgment determine sufficiency. 
 I apply theory from the organizational behavior literature to examine how auditors 
determine when the have collected sufficient audit evidence. Browne and Pitts (2004) identify 
four information acquisition stopping rules that they theorize are most likely to be applicable to 
design problems (as opposed to choice problems). Information search for a design problem 
focuses on evidence sufficiency, whereas in choice problems the goal is to arrive at a correct 
answer. Therefore, information search strategies for design problems are more likely to be 
applicable to audit evidence collection. 
  The four stopping rules for design problems identified by Browne and Pitts are: 
magnitude threshold, mental list, difference threshold, and representational stability. The 
magnitude threshold rule posits that an individual maintains a mental calculation of the 
cumulative impact of all evidence gathered and will stop when the sum of the evidence surpasses 
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a predetermined amount. The mental list rule posits that a person has a criteria set in their mind 
against which they asses the sufficiency of information collected. The difference threshold rule 
posits that a person evaluates the incremental value of the most recent item obtained and stops 
searching for additional information when no longer learning anything new. The 
representational stability rule posits that a person continues to collect information as long as the 
new information adds something to their mental model of the problem. 
 I conducted interviews with practicing or former public accountants to gain an 
understanding of which rule or rules best represent auditors’ evidence sufficiency judgments. 
The interviewees recounted experiences in which it was either easy or difficult for them to know 
when they had collected sufficient audit evidence. Throughout these conversations I noted a few 
overarching themes. In general, the Mental List stopping rule seemed to best represent the 
scenarios described. The audit program serves as something of a collective mental list built upon 
the expertise of many members of the firm. In some cases audit programs were described as 
being well defined and seemingly infallible. 
I would [compare] that to that technical work program that I was talking about. I 
want to see these attributes and once I see these attributes, I’m done. Not, "Okay, 
I’ve seen these attributes. Is there anything else that I necessarily need? " 
        - Audit Partner 1 
 
While other interviewees seemed to acknowledge that following the audit program blindly is not 
always adequate. 
[J]ust by following the audit programs, …they’re rather detailed. They still do 
contain some level of subjectivity based on the risk of the client…but generally 
speaking, … making it through the audit program makes me comfortable.  
       - Audit Senior 1 
 
However, even when no audit plan existed, interviewees spoke of applying a basic mental list as 
a starting point. 
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[W]ith any process…you’re going to go through and say,  “Alright, I’ve got the 
transaction. I’ve understood the transaction. I’ve tested the inputs and…tested the 
calculations.”  
       - Audit Manger 1 
 
Overall, for the easy scenarios participants tended to describe tasks, such as cash reconciliations, 
that varied little over time and from client to client and therefore have well developed audit 
programs. For the difficult scenarios, however, participants tended to describe unusual 
transactions or events for which the audit program was not as well developed. 
 The easy and difficult scenarios differed in a number of other ways, in addition to the 
level of audit program development. In the easy scenarios the audit program was detailed, easy 
to implement and very similar either to procedures performed in prior year or on another auditee. 
In the difficult scenarios the transaction was nonstandard and sometimes unique, required 
significant amounts of professional judgment, and involved a high level of subject matter 
expertise. The detailed analysis of these differences informs my experimental design for Study 2. 
Interview Method 
Participants 
 Study 1 analyzes interviews conducted with one former and 14 practicing public 
accountants. All of the participants had experience in public accounting as financial statement 
auditors. I selected participants with varying ranks (average experience) such that I spoke with 
five Senior or In-charge auditors (henceforth, Senior) (3.4 years), five Manager or Senior 
Managers (henceforth, Manager) (8.4 years) and five Directors or Partners (henceforth, Partner) 
(22.4 years) (Table 1).1 Across all ranks the participants possessed an average (standard 
deviation) of 11.4 (9.8) years experience. Of the 15 total participants 12 had experience at Big 4 
                                                            
1 Participants with the rank of Partner reported a significantly greater years experience as an auditor than either the 
Senior (F1,12= 29.79; p < 0.001, two-tailed) or Manager (F1,12= 16.17; p = .002, two-tailed) ranks. There was not a 
significant difference in experience between the Senior and Manager ranks (F1,12= 2.06; p = .176, two-tailed) 
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accounting firms while the remaining three participants gained their auditing experience at a 
regional midsize firm. The participants possessed a range of industry specializations including 
Financial Services (6), Insurance (3), Real Estate (3), Manufacturing (2), and Public Sector (1). 
Interview Structure 
 The purpose of these interviews was to gain an understanding of the conditions under 
which it is difficult for financial statement auditors to know whether they have collected 
sufficient audit evidence upon which to base their judgments. These semi-structured interviews 
were administered either in person or by phone by the author and lasted 43.6 (7.9) minutes on 
average (standard deviation). All of the interviews were transcribed to facilitate analysis and 
these transcripts averaged (standard deviation) 6,983.0 (1,597.8) words. 
 Similar to previous accounting interview studies the primary interview questions required 
participants to recall previous audit experiences and relate the scenario, in detail, to the 
researcher (Gibbins and Newton 1994; Gibbins et al. 2001). Specifically, participants recalled 
two separate auditing experiences, one in which it was very easy to know when they had 
collected sufficient audit evidence and one in which this determination was very difficult 
(Appendix A, Primary Questions 1 and 2). The author randomized the interview materials prior 
to the commencement of any interviews regarding whether participants would describe the 
difficult or easy scenario first. Participants reported demographic information such as age and 
rank between scenarios as a distractor task. The purpose of the distractor task was to decrease 
participant anchoring on the first scenario described and to facilitate a greater degree of 
difference between the scenarios selected. Table 2 provides a brief description of the scenarios 
described by each participant.  
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 At the conclusion of the conversation regarding each scenario, but before proceeding to 
the demographic or other interview questions, participants completed a brief survey instrument. 
The survey consisted of scale questions designed to capture differences between the two 
examples in a more quantitative way (see Appendix B for the survey questionnaire). At least two 
potential sources of bias exist for the scenarios participants selected. (1) The scenarios selected 
may be atypical since unusual situations are easier to recall. (2) The participants may select very 
difficult and moderately difficult, rather than difficult and easy scenarios as a method of ego 
bolstering (i.e., purporting that something that is difficult for most is easy for themself). I attempt 
to reduce the ill effects of these biases by focusing on differences in key characteristics between 
the scenarios within subjects, rather than on the level of each scenario between subjects. At the 
conclusion of both survey questionnaires participants had the opportunity to suggest any 
additional significant differences between the two scenarios that was not noted on the survey 
(Appendix A, Primary Question 3). The most common responses were (n): complexity of client, 
transaction, or accounting rule (3), estimate uncertainty (3), management competence (2), and 
audit or inherent risk (2). 
 The remainder of the interview questions solicited participant’s opinions and 
observations about difficulty judging evidence sufficiency in general, rather than with regard to 
specific scenarios. Primary Questions four and six aimed to gather greater insight on applications 
of professional judgment and root causes of disagreements regarding audit evidence sufficiency 
(Appendix A). Primary Questions five and seven aimed to learn how auditors proceed when the 
audit program is incomplete or insufficiently specified (Appendix A). The author asked the 
Supplemental Questions when time remaining after the Primary Questions allowed. These 
questions aimed to explore some common audit research constructs such as reviewer vs. preparer 
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perspective and the use of red flags in identifying insufficient evidence. Finally, some of the 
participants provided real world audit tasks where they utilized each of Browne and Pitts (2004) 
four stopping rules (Appendix A). 
Results and Analysis 
 To identify themes across the scenarios provided by the interviewees regarding what 
made the auditing task difficult, I perform a two-step analysis on the survey questionnaire 
responses. I first determine which questions elicited responses that varied significantly between 
easy and hard scenarios and then perform a factor analysis on the responses to the difficult 
scenario for the questions identified in Step 1. Using repeated measures ANOVA, I examine the 
effects of scenario difficulty and auditor rank, while controlling for order in which the 
interviewee described the scenarios (i.e., easy first or difficult first). I find a significant main 
effect of difficulty for all but three of the twelve questions. Accordingly, Question 7, the amount 
of evidence collected personally (F1, 9 = 4.16; p = 0.069, two-tailed), Question 8, the degree to 
which management offered evidence to the auditor (F1, 9 = 0.06; p = 0.815, two-tailed), and 
Question 12, the relationship between the auditor and management (F1, 9 = 2.10; p = 0.181, two-
tailed), were excluded from further analysis. The second step of the analysis uses participant’s 
responses to the remaining ten questions from the difficult questionnaire in a factor analysis that 
reveals four themes regarding what made the scenarios difficult to audit (Table 3).  
 Bonner’s Framework for Judgment and Decision Making (JDM) Research in Accounting 
(2008) proposes three general classifications of factors that are likely to influence auditor JDM: 
task, environment, and person. These factors are descriptive of the conceptual factors identified 
in the survey questionnaire analysis. I discuss each factor individually in the following sections. 
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Task Variables 
 Task variables are factors that are characteristics of that can vary either between or within 
specific tasks auditors perform (Bonner 2008). In this research the tasks are the transactions that 
the auditors found either easy or difficult to know when they had sufficient audit evidence. I find 
that the survey questions load on two different task related factors. The four questions (factor 
loadings) that comprise the task-internal factor pertain to the amount of professional judgment 
required (0.98), how routine the transaction was for the client (0.92), the subjectivity of the audit 
evidence (0.67), and the average expertise of other audit team members (0.67) (Table 3). The 
first three items are all characteristics of the transaction being audited or of the related audit 
evidence. The final item, average expertise of other audit team members, is likely loads on the 
task variable because audit firms assign more experienced audit team members to non-routine, 
highly subjective transactions. The question (factor loading) that comprises the task-external 
factor pertains to task characteristics dictated by regulators through accounting guidance 
ambiguity (.98) (Table 3). I next consider each component of this factor in greater detail. 
Professional Judgment 
 The auditor should use professional judgment in determining the nature, timing and 
extent of audit evidence that should be examined and also when evaluating the adequacy of that 
evidence prior to opining on the financial statements (AICPA 2006). Researchers have long 
understood the importance of better understanding auditors’ use of professional judgment and the 
factors that influence its application (Joyce 1976; Gibbins 1984). More recently, the literature 
has focused on how the application of appropriate professional judgment becomes crucial to 
audit quality as the complexity of, and the uncertainty associated with, the transaction increases 
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(Peecher et al. 2013). Therefore, on average, the more professional judgment auditing a 
transaction requires, the more difficult it will be for the auditor to know when sufficient audit 
evidence has been collected. 
 Participants rated the amount of professional judgment required to audit the transactions 
described in both scenarios they provided (easy and difficult) on an 11-point scale. The endpoints 
of the scale were "0 = No professional judgment used“ and "10 = Extensive professional 
judgment used” while the midpoint was marked as "5 = Moderate professional judgment used” 
(Table 4). Participants rated the difficult scenarios as requiring significantly more professional 
judgment than the easy scenarios (F1, 9 = 64.74; p < 0.001, two-tailed). The difference in level of 
professional judgment required often seems to rely on the nature of the underlying evidence (i.e., 
subjective vs. objective) and the nature of the underlying accounting rule (i.e., historical cost vs. 
fair value estimation). 
Well, there’s no judgment involved. [V]ersus an area of estimation…it’s a very 
black and white transaction and…you’re able to see the dollar amount involved. 
You’re able to see the parties involved. You’re able to see that everything 
matches up very clearly and…the dates match up…so you’re able to conclude 
pretty easily.  
        - Audit Partner 3 
 
[T]he example that I think people…could differ on vastly would be…security 
valuations and particularly on…these illiquid securities, these private label 
mortgage backs. I’m sure there’s been instances where a client has supplied, 
“here’s our information” and I’m sure there’s been instances when some auditors 
have accepted that and others have asked to go further. …I think some…would 
live with management’s judgments and estimates and some would feel like…they 
needed some outside validation.  
       - Audit Partner 4 
 
I find the effect of professional judgment consistently across auditor ranks. Senior (F1, 3 = 45.07; 
p = 0.059, two-tailed), Manager (F1, 3 = 110.04; p = 0.002, two-tailed), and Partner (F1, 3 = 19.87; 
p = 0.021, two-tailed) rank auditors all indicated at least a moderately significant difference of 
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professional judgment between the easy and difficult scenarios. Overall, the amount of 
professional judgment required was a major difference between scenarios when it was easy 
versus difficult to know whether sufficient audit evidence had been collected. 
Routineness 
 Routineness in an audit context refers to the frequency with which a company engages in 
a particular type or size of accounting transaction (AICPA 2010). Routine processes tend to be 
central to the company's core operations including the primary revenue generating activities and 
administrative functions. These areas, because of their importance to the company and the 
volume of transactions processed are likely to have well established, and often automated, 
processes (AICPA 2010). Since routine processes are typically less complex than non-routine 
processes the auditor likely has established audit procedures that they perform year after year 
with little variation. Additionally, universally routine processes, such as payroll, tend to be fairly 
standardized across companies such that even new auditors to a client likely have experience 
auditing these transactions. Therefore, on average, the more routine a process is the easier it will 
likely be for the auditor to know when sufficient audit evidence has been collected. 
 Participants rated the routineness of the transactions being audited for both scenarios they 
provided (easy and difficult) on an 11-point scale. The endpoints of the scale were "0 = Routine" 
and "10 = Non-routine" while the midpoint was marked as "5 = Neither routine nor non-routine” 
(Table 5). Participants rated the difficult scenarios as significantly less routine than the easy 
scenarios (F1, 9 = 11.56; p < 0.008, two-tailed). One participant noted that non-routine 
transactions can create difficulties for auditors due to challenges obtaining all of the pertinent 
information so that the audit team can design an appropriate response. 
[T]he client explained that they were shipping product to a place that basically 
was still being built so it wasn’t quite ready to receive the product. So they were 
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going to ship it to another location, a third party warehouse, and there’s specific 
revenue recognition guidance on when you ship to somewhere other than the 
ultimate destination in order to conclude that you have revenue. …[W]e had the 
company document specific facts as we understood them and then we could reach 
a conclusion. And so, in that…memo there were certain things…that they either 
hadn’t conveyed to us, or conveyed slightly differently verbally. …[S]o we said, 
‘Can we see additional documentation?’ and…we ultimately reached a different 
conclusion than we thought we would reach from the verbal conversation.”  
       - Audit Manager 3 
 
Interestingly, I did not find this effect consistently across auditor ranks. Senior and Manager rank 
auditors both indicated that the difficult scenario was, with at least marginal significance, more 
routine (F1, 3 = 9.94; p = 0.051, two-tailed and F1, 3 = 11.84; p = 0.041, two-tailed, respectively). 
However, Partner ranked participants did not note such a difference (F1, 3 = 0.03; p = 0.878, two-
tailed). For both the easy and difficult scenarios, the average partner response was below the 
midpoint of the scale, indicating that both scenarios described were routine in nature. 
 Although I do not make directional predictions ex ante, the findings at the Partner rank do 
appear counterintuitive. Had I made predictions a priori I would have expected the partners to 
would select extremely routine situations for the easy case and extremely non-routine situations 
for the difficult case. Alternatively, one might expect partners to select only more non-routine 
cases, as these would be places where their input was more often needed and would, therefore, 
be more salient in the partner's mind. In this case we might expect to observe a ceiling effect on 
this question. The results instead indicate what would be consistent with an interaction between 
experience and perceived routineness. The least experienced participants, seniors, gave responses 
indicating that they thought of routineness as whether they had received explicit training related 
to the transaction or not. 
We have a training program for how to audit cash and it’s…the first thing you go 
to when you first started so it’s pretty standard, routine and…you know people 
expect to see.  
       - Audit Senior 3 
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The partners had significantly more years of audit experience than either of the other two rank 
groups (22.4 years vs. seniors' 3.4 years and managers' 8.4 years). It may be that perceptions of 
routineness are highly correlated with novelty or how often an auditor has encountered a 
transaction in the past. Given that the partners surveyed had an extra decade of experience over 
the other groups they are less likely to encounter a transaction they would deem truly novel and 
therefore may have an artificially high threshold for deeming a transaction non-routine. 
Consistent with this explanation is one partner’s discussion of the subtle differences in fairly 
routine estimates at a financial services client. 
[W]ith the allowance for loan losses there, there’s not a known, exact, “this is the 
right answer.” …[O]ne could say there’s not an exact right answer on the value 
of servicing assets, but I think you can look to more routine kinds of projections 
of values [or] discounted cash flows…you’ve seen many others that are in the 
same ballpark so you can feel comfortable with [the estimate]. [W]ith the 
allowance and the estimate of a loan loss it’s, you know, just because someone 
else had a loan like that doesn’t mean it’s going to be the same result.  
       - Audit Partner 4 
 
Evidence Subjectivity 
 Audit evidence subjectivity varies widely from very objective items, such as third party 
bank statements, to very subjective items, such as management prepared estimates of warranty 
reserves. Accounting estimates, in general, are likely to be based on management’s interpretation 
of the current environment and predictions about future events. This in turn results in audit 
evidence that possesses a high level of subjective elements, which are harder for the auditor to 
verify than objective facts (AICPA 1989). Therefore, on average, the more subjective the audit 
evidence is the more difficult it will likely be for the auditor to know when sufficient audit 
evidence has been collected. 
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 Participants rated the subjectivity of the transactions being audited for both scenarios they 
provided (easy and difficult) on an 11-point scale. The endpoints of the scale were "0 = Entirely 
objective” and "10 = Entirely subjective” while the midpoint was marked as "5 = Equally 
subjective and objective” (Table 6). Participants rated the evidence in the difficult scenarios as 
significantly more subjective than in the easy scenarios (F1, 9 = 9.34; p = 0.014, two-tailed). In the 
difficult scenarios, participants spoke of estimates that were challenging to validate due to the 
subjectivity of the assumptions and the use of specialists as an attempt to evaluate 
reasonableness. 
Because valuations are very subjective…we were skeptical of the results. 
…Because it was a start up entity…you could have wildly different assumptions.  
       - Audit Partner 5 
 
[T]here were two assumptions that [the valuation specialists] specifically helped 
with. …[T]he calculation is based on a couple…different methodologies and how 
you weight those methodologies is judgmental. Based on their experience and the 
number of valuations they’ve seen, they were able to provide some insight 
into…how they believe [the methodologies] should be weighted and the rational 
for that. …The second one…is the discount rate, which is built up over a 
combination of things and certain components - part of the discount rate is based 
on the risk free rate which is objective - other components are much more 
subjective. And so, based on their knowledge of the business compared to similar 
businesses that they’ve performed valuations on, they’re able to see on the 
subjective component how much additional risk do our specific facts [add 
compared] to…companies that are similar in stature.  
       - Audit Manager 3 
 
Although only significant within the Senior rank (F1, 3 = 10.40; p = 0.048, two-tailed), I find 
results directionally consistent with this effect across all auditor ranks. Overall, the subjectivity 
of evidence was a significant difference between scenarios when it was easy versus difficult to 
know whether sufficient audit evidence had been collected. 
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Team Expertise 
 When auditing a transaction, auditors have the option to engage internal or external 
specialists that have greater subject matter expertise (PCAOB 2003). In the 1990’s researchers 
noted a change in the organization of audit firms toward a model that emphasized industry 
specialized knowledge (Solomon et al. 1999). As auditee business models and the related 
transactions have continued to grow in complexity, understanding the use of both internal and 
external experts by audit teams has become critical (Griffith et al. 2014). Specialists are typically 
brought onto audits to review unusual, large, and/or high-risk transactions.  
[The firm’s subject matter experts] have a lot of insight, and again we’re talking 
to real estate specific people, so they have a lot more knowledge and wherewithal 
about what’s going on in industry and what we see in industry practice. …So as 
opposed [to our]… smaller group here in Chicago, we were able to leverage off of 
what they’ve seen, talked about, heard from the SEC, and…leveraged their 
experience and their knowledge.  
       - Audit Manager 4 
 
Therefore, on average, audit firms are likely to assign audit teams with greater levels of expertise 
to audit transactions that are more difficult to determine audit evidence sufficiency. Some of the 
audit firms have cultivated reputations for being specialists in certain client industries in certain 
markets. One interviewee highlighted the need for a firm to ensure that they can provide 
appropriate team expertise. 
I wouldn’t say it’s common, but in first year audit clients we have 
had…disagreements with the prior audit firm…[on] the allowance, or some other 
significant estimate, and I don’t know how to answer why their views were so 
different. I tend to think it is more related to their lack of expertise in an area that 
requires more specific knowledge than they possess.  
       - Audit Partner 4 
 
 Participants rated the average expertise of other audit team members working on the 
transactions in both scenarios they provided (easy and difficult) on an 11-point scale. The 
endpoints of the scale were "0 = No expertise” and "10 = Nationally recognized expert” while 
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the midpoint was marked as "5 = Moderate level of expertise” (Table 7). Participants rated the 
difficult scenarios as employing significantly more experienced audit teams than the easy 
scenarios (F1, 9 = 9.40; p < 0.013, two-tailed). Overall, the amount of professional judgment 
required was a major difference between scenarios when it was easy versus difficult to know 
whether sufficient audit evidence had been collected. 
 Additional analysis of the expertise results indicate that the effect is likely related to how 
audit firms assign professionals to individual transactions or tasks. The inclusion of routineness 
ratings as a covariate in the analysis negates the significant effect of expertise, but the expertise 
results are robust to the inclusion of professional judgment ratings as a covariate. Since estimates 
that require professional judgment to evaluate can be routine and quite common to certain clients 
and industries, these results indicate that the effect of expertise is likely due to audit teams 
selecting more experienced professionals for more unusual transactions or, in other words, the 
expertise of the team assigned is a reflection of task characteristics. One of the participants 
echoed this sentiment when discussing the difficult scenario. 
There were more people involved from the client side because of the technical 
nature of this. You needed certain people [on the audit team] that had various 
expertises.  
        - Audit Manager 3 
 
Accounting Guidance Ambiguity 
 Ambiguity in reference to accounting standards most typically refers to rules versus 
principles based accounting rules. Standard type has been found to influence auditors’ 
perceptions of negotiation outcomes (Jamal and Tan 2010) and interact with auditor mindsets to 
influence financial statement quality (Ng and Tan 2003). Ambiguity can also be created through 
transformation of business models beyond what standard setters could have anticipated when 
originally drafting the accounting guidance. 
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There there’s an emerging revenue issue…[with] revenue earned from playing 
games on Facebook. …[T]he issue is, the total amount of revenue is known, but 
how you record that - whether you record what’s called “gross” in the revenue 
line item or whether you record it “net” as an agent - is different. And so, because 
revenue from online social media…is a new concept, there’s not authoritative 
guidance to directly address it. …[S]o how you reach the conclusion as to whether 
you meet the criteria to record it gross or record it net is based on applying your 
facts to [a set of] guidance that wasn’t written with [social media games] in mind. 
…I can tell from publicly filed documents [of two companies with these 
transactions], neither one of which are my client, [that] the same set of facts are 
currently being treated differently.  
        - Audit Manager 3 
 
Increased ambiguity in a standard would likely make it more difficult to know what audit 
evidence would provide the greatest assurance. Therefore, when there is greater accounting 
guidance ambiguity the auditor will likely report it was more difficult to conclude on whether 
they have collected sufficient evidence.  
 Participants rated the amount of accounting guidance ambiguity that existed in both 
scenarios they provided (easy vs. hard to know when sufficient evidence had been collected) on 
an 11-point scale. The endpoints of the scale were "0 = Extremely unambiguous" and "10 = 
Extremely ambiguous" while the midpoint was marked as "Neither ambiguous nor 
unambiguous" (Table 8). Overall, participants did report that guidance ambiguity was higher in 
the scenarios where it was difficult to determine when they had collected sufficient audit 
evidence (F1, 9 = 7.52; p = 0.023, two-tailed). All ranks of auditors reported results that were 
directionally consistent with these combined findings. The Manager rank displayed the most 
significant difference indicating that these auditors likely encounter the greatest amount of 
variation in perceived guidance ambiguity on a daily basis. Manager rank auditors are often 
responsible for reviewing work done areas they are very familiar with and that have very little 
ambiguity (e.g., cash), but are also often the first to tackle accounting treatment questions on 
new, unfamiliar issues identified by the audit team or client management. 
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 The analyses also indicated an order effect, related to which scenario the participant 
provided first (easy vs. difficult), that interacted with rank (F1, 9 = 5.50; p = 0.028, two-tailed). 
Further investigation of this interaction provided evidence that order effect was present in only 
the Senior rank. Senior participants rated scenarios to have significantly less accounting 
treatment ambiguity when describing the difficult scenario first (F1, 3 = 159.16; p = 0.001, two-
tailed). The fact that the Senior rank shows an order effect where as the Manager and Partner 
ranks do not indicates that they are likely not well calibrated to how much ambiguity exists in the 
various accounting standards. 
Environmental Variables 
 Environmental variables are factors that do not pertain to a specific individual or task, but 
instead relate to the conditions under which the individual must perform (Bonner 2008). The 
three questions (factor loadings) that comprise the environment factor pertain to management’s 
outcome preference (0.87), the similarity of working papers to prior year (0.75), and budgetary 
pressures (0.75) (Table 3). While the first and last items are clearly environmental in nature and 
unrelated to the specific task, the second item is less obviously environmental in nature. Since I 
did not ask participants specifically why the working papers were less similar to prior year 
working papers in the difficult scenario I interpret this loading as environmental challenges being 
instrumental as to why the working papers were dissimilar. For example, anticipated regulatory 
scrutiny or internal quality review required reworking of what was done in prior years to meet 
reviewer expectations. I next consider each component of this factor in greater detail. 
Treatment Conflict 
 When auditors and management disagree regarding the accounting treatment they must 
negotiate a mutually agreeable outcome or, if no agreement can be made, the auditor and auditee 
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will terminate their relationship. Accounting research on these negotiation processes focuses 
primarily on the interpersonal interactions between management and the auditor as well as the 
strategies they employ during those interactions (McCracken et al. 2008). The persuasiveness of 
the auditors’ argument rests upon the evidence they are able to provide and since auditor 
evidence review is often constrained by cost and volume, it is important for auditors to identify 
the best evidence to support their position (Gibbons et al. 2001). It thus follows that in scenarios 
where management’s accounting preference conflicts with the auditor it will be more difficult for 
the auditor to know when sufficient audit evidence has been collected. 
 Participants rated the amount of agreement with management regarding proper 
accounting for the transactions described in both scenarios they provided (easy and difficult) on 
an 11-point scale. The endpoints of the scale were “0 = Management preference agreed with 
auditor” and “10 = Management preference conflicted with auditor” while the midpoint was 
marked as "5 = Management expressed no preference” (Table 9). Participants rated the difficult 
scenarios as more likely to have a conflict with management than the easy scenarios with 
marginal significance (F1, 7 = 5.00; p = 0.061, two-tailed). While this directional effect was 
observed across ranks, only the Partner rank reported a mean above the midpoint in the difficult 
scenario and the responses within the Partner rank appear to drive the overall results. This is 
likely due to the fact that lower ranks have less exposure to management pressure regarding 
accounting treatment conflicts. One partner participant described the difficulty experienced in 
resolving treatment conflict. 
It was not an easy answer. I consulted with our national office. I consulted with 
our SEC reviewing partner. I consulted with our risk management partner because 
it was such a significant…transaction…that I felt I needed to do that. …It 
was…hours and hours and hours of research and debate.  
       - Audit Partner 5 
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Overall, these results suggest that accounting treatment disagreements with management vary 
between scenarios when it is easy versus difficult to know whether sufficient audit evidence had 
been collected. 
Working Paper Similarity 
 Auditors are sometimes criticized for preferring to audit the same as last year, or SALY, 
through performing the same audit procedures year after year and using prior year working 
papers as a guide (Wright 1988). This technique is ineffective, and sometimes unavailable, in 
dynamic business environments. For auditees with evolving processes, obtaining the same audit 
evidence as prior year is likely ineffective, inefficient, or both. Auditors’ general preference to 
audit SALY, despite potential detriments to audit quality, provides evidence that more stable 
business environments are likely less difficult in terms of determining evidence sufficiency. 
Therefore, working papers will likely be less similar to prior years in the difficult scenarios than 
in the easy scenarios. 
 Participants rated the similarity of the working papers to prior year’s working papers for 
the transactions described in both scenarios they provided (easy and difficult) on an 11-point 
scale. The endpoints of the scale were “0 = Identical to prior year” and “10 = No resemblance to 
prior year” while the midpoint was marked as "5 = Moderately similar to prior year” (Table 10). 
Participants rated the difficult scenarios as having significantly less similar working papers to 
prior year than the easy scenarios (F1, 8 = 11.35; p = 0.010, two-tailed). This effect is 
directionally consistent across all ranks for auditors. Overall, working papers were less similar to 
prior year when it was difficult to know whether sufficient audit evidence had been collected. 
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Budget Pressure 
 Auditors are constrained by time budgets as to how much audit evidence they can collect 
and examine. Prior research indicates that greater amounts of time budget pressure result in 
decreases in the extent and depth of testing performed by auditors (Asare et al. 2000). When 
budget pressures are high overall the selection of the best possible audit evidence becomes more 
crucial. Additionally, decisions to continue to collect more evidence once already over budget 
must be justified to the audit team and management. It follows then that it would be more 
difficult to know whether sufficient evidence had been collected when auditors are faced with 
these pressures to justify their conclusions. Therefore, the audit engagement as a whole will 
likely be more over budget in the difficult scenarios than in the easy scenarios. 
 Participants rated the status of the engagement’s budget during work on the transactions 
described in both scenarios they provided (easy and difficult) on an 11-point scale. The endpoints 
of the scale were “0 = Extremely under budget” and “10 = Extremely over budget” while the 
midpoint was marked as "5 = On budget” (Table 11). Participants rated the difficult scenarios as 
being significantly more over budget than the easy scenarios (F1, 9 = 21.42; p = 0.001, two-
tailed). This effect is directionally consistent across all ranks for auditors, but is driven by the 
Partner rank participants. Overall, audit engagements were more over budget when it was 
difficult to know whether sufficient audit evidence had been collected. 
 Participants across all ranks also identified budget pressure as a reason that an auditor 
might not collect sufficient evidence. 
I would say…budget constraints would be a big one. …Ultimately that’s probably 
the top one.  
       -Audit Senior 4 
 
I guess I would say, probably they didn’t have enough time. Or they didn’t 
request [documentation from the client] early enough. Or maybe it was an issue 
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that came up last minute and there hadn’t necessarily historically been issues on 
[that] client so maybe they were a little bit more trusting. More so probably just 
timing of it, whether it’s budget constraints or just deadlines to wrap up the 
engagement, etc.  
       - Audit Manager 1 
 
Some might say maybe they’ve already spent the budget, but I would choose to 
say they probably believe the client is trustworthy.  
       - Audit Partner 4 
 
Person Variables 
 Person variables are factors that relate to characteristics of the individual auditor as a 
decision maker (Bonner 2008). The question (factor loadings) that comprised the personal factor 
pertains to the amount of personal experience the auditor had with similar transactions (0.96) 
(Table 3). Experience is very closely related to topical knowledge, which varies across individual 
auditors and is specific to the task at hand. Tasks that an auditor has a great deal of knowledge 
about will, in general, be less difficult than tasks for which the auditor possesses little relevant 
knowledge. 
Experience 
 The amount of experience auditors have with a type of transaction or an audit area will 
influence their ability to determine when they have collected sufficient audit evidence. Prior 
research has found that auditors with greater experience perform better on more complex tasks  
(Simnett 1996; Alissa et al. 2014). According to Browne and Pitts (2004) more experienced 
professionals can generate more effective mental lists. Auditors with greater experience will be 
able to better evaluate a transaction for similarities with work they have performed in the past 
and use evidence sufficiency criteria that have been successful in those scenarios.  
I think another thing would be…based on my own experience with whatever it is 
we’re auditing. …[S]o someone says, “We can’t get a system generated list from 
X application.” [I think,] “No, my client over there does. So I know that you can 
do it!” So that would be another reason that I think I would say, “You know what, 
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no.” …[J]ust generally if it’s something that we maybe haven’t either asked for or 
we’ve struggled to get in the past I would push again and say, “Let’s try to think 
of another way to get this information,” as opposed to just [letting the audit client 
tell] us, “No, it’s not going to work. It’s not going to work. It’s not going to 
work.”  
       - Audit Partner 1 
 
I think the experienced person is going to know, or have in their head, what he or 
she wants to find. [For example,] these three things and as long as these three 
things are there, or these three things make sense or, …are related to each other in 
the right way, then they’ll be satisfied. Whereas the inexperienced auditor, 
…hopefully they know that they don’t know…and that they should ask others that 
are more experienced as to what’s sufficient.  
       - Audit Partner 3 
 
Therefore, auditors will likely report having less experience when describing difficult scenarios 
than when describing easy scenarios. 
 Participants rated the amount of experience that they personally had working on the type 
of transaction described in both scenarios they provided (easy and difficult) on an 11-point scale. 
The endpoints of the scale were "0 = No experience" and "10 = Extensive experience" while the 
midpoint was marked as "5 = Moderate experience" (Table 12). Not surprisingly, participant 
responses indicate that they had significantly less experience auditing the types of transactions 
described in the difficult scenarios (F1, 9 = 12.76; p = 0.006, two-tailed). 
[My manager is] more experienced in this so he would be able to not only more 
quickly identify the areas that we need to validate, but also…to tell on his own if 
certain areas…performed adequately or appear reasonable. Where [as] I might 
have to ask somebody…[and] dig into it a little more.  
        - Audit Senior 4 
 
These results are directionally consistent across all ranks with the Partner rank showing the 
smallest difference. For both scenarios, the Partner rank noted fairly high levels of experience, 
which indicates that this question may capture a ceiling effect of the extensive auditing 
experience of these participants. Overall, the results provide evidence that experience in auditing 
a certain type of transaction aids the auditor in making judgments about evidence sufficiency.  
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Conclusions 
 I find that of the four stopping rules identified by Browne and Pitts (2004), auditors most 
closely adhere to a mental list rule when judging evidence sufficiency. In practice, the audit 
program serves as a mental list representing the collective knowledge of the audit firm. When the 
audit program attributes were adequately specified, auditors described evidence sufficiency 
decisions as relatively easy. However, when audit program specifications were unclear, 
inadequate, or unavailable, auditors described evidence sufficiency judgments as relatively 
difficult. I then performed further analyses regarding the characteristics of scenarios that fell into 
each category (i.e., easy vs. difficult). 
 The results of the interview analyses indicate that all three types of variables in Bonner’s 
(2008) Judgment and Decision Making in Accounting Framework differ across scenarios where 
it was easy versus difficult for auditors to know whether they had collected sufficient audit 
evidence. For task variables, auditors reported difficult scenarios required more professional 
judgment, related to transactions that were less routine, required the examination of more 
subjective evidence, utilized more experienced audit teams, and the accounting guidance was 
more ambiguous. For environmental variables, auditors reported difficult scenarios had more 
disagreement with management over the appropriate accounting treatment, less similarity in the 
final working papers compared to prior year, and greater time budget pressure. For person 
variables, auditors reported having less experience in the difficult scenarios.  
 I use the above observations to inform my design of Study 2. One of the more interesting 
observations from Study 1 was the interaction between participant rank and the perceived 
routineness of the easy vs. difficult transactions described. I posit that because of partners’ vast 
experience, it is less likely partners will encounter transactions that are truly novel and this 
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decreases overall perceptions of routineness.2 In other words, increased experience has made 
transactions appear familiar to partner ranked auditors than do to more junior ranked auditors. 
For the more junior auditors, unfamiliar transactions pose a greater challenge in determining how 
their auditing knowledge can be applied to collect sufficient, competent audit evidence. In Study 
2, I apply the Search for Ideas in Associative Memory model to investigate how and to aid 
auditors in accessing a greater amount of relevant knowledge when auditing both familiar and 
unfamiliar transactions. 
  
                                                            
2 It is important to note that truly unique transactions do occur, regardless of perceived routineness. For example, 
Lehman Brothers’ Repo 105 transactions were unique and failure of the auditors to fully appreciate this likely 
played some part in Lehman’s collapse. 
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III. STUDY 2: THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 Regulatory scrutiny in the wake of recent accounting scandal places increased pressure 
on auditing firms to emphasize error reduction and to, arguably, restrict individual auditors’ 
professional judgment. Other professional organizations, such as the Central Intelligence Agency 
and the British Broadcasting Corporation, similarly chose to focus on error reduction in the wake 
of publicized failures, but have since observed instances where overall performance was 
impaired by not encouraging the flexible idea generation of employees (Klein 2013). The 
creation of the PCOAB and the release of their inspection findings has highlighted the 
importance of gaining a better understanding what it means to obtain sufficient audit evidence. 
Naturally, the word sufficient calls to mind questions regarding the quantity of evidence 
collected. Research shows that PCAOB deficiency findings that can be remedied by increasing 
the quantity of evidence obtained (i.e., audit sampling) appear to be in decline. However, 
judgment related deficiencies (i.e., fair value measurements) where the type of evidence can be 
more crucial to sufficiency than quantity appear to persist (Church and Shefchik 2012).  
 In Study 1 I find that auditors use the audit program as a mental list, which they use to 
assess the sufficiency of audit evidence collected. In the case of quantity deficiencies, 
standardization and error reduction tactics might increase sample size noted on the audit program 
or improve controls governing adherence to the audit program (e.g., restrict ability to change the 
audit program, clarify sampling policy, implement controls requiring use of sampling software, 
etc.). In the case of judgment related deficiencies the mental list (i.e., audit program) itself is 
likely deficient and it is therefore unclear how stricter adherence to the audit program will help 
auditors identify higher quality, and thus more sufficient, audit evidence. Additionally, audit 
firms that increase organizational control through standardization risk sacrificing the audit 
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teams’ ability to provide required levels of unpredictability in audit procedures and their 
likelihood of identifying audit process improvements (AICPA 2006; PCAOB 2007; IFAC 2009; 
PCAOB 2010; Budescu et al. 2012). For example, standardized testing of information 
technology access controls requires auditors to select a sample of employees and manually check 
whether their system access is appropriate, but selecting this procedure because it is firm-
recommended ignores technological advancements that now make it possible at some auditees to 
test 100% of employees in less time (Anonymous Audit Executive Director 2012).  
 Promoting flexible idea generation can also be beneficial to auditors facing relatively 
unfamiliar audit planning tasks. Auditors who are encouraged to exercise flexible professional 
judgment will be more successful at identifying commonalities between unfamiliar transactions 
and existing audit knowledge and responding accordingly when no standard audit program 
exists. For example, prior to the financial crisis there was no precedent for determining the 
appropriate audit evidence to collect when auditing a loss share agreement in which a bank 
purchased deposits and loans from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (Anonymous 
Audit Senior 2012). Although audit firms and regulators are unlikely to dispute the need for 
encouraging innovative audits, particularly in light of a rapidly evolving business environment 
(e.g., increased use of big data), there is little incentive for any one auditor to consider 
alternatives to standard procedures on their audits even if explicitly told to do so (Low and Tan 
2011; Arning 2013; Chipman 2013; Peecher et al. 2013). 
 Using the Search for Ideas in Associative Memory (SIAM) model from psychology to 
guide this investigation, I consider the potential benefits of priming a counterfactual mindset on 
audit evidence idea generation in two audit planning tasks where I also manipulate the presence 
or absence of an example standard audit procedure. Both accounting and psychology research 
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document that prompts encouraging a decision maker to engage in counterfactual thinking can 
improve judgment by increasing the amount and variety of information considered (Koonce 
1992; Kray and Galinsky 2003; Galinsky and Kray 2004). Priming a counterfactual mindset will 
allow this increased information consideration to spill over onto subsequent tasks where 
subconscious barriers would otherwise hinder the effectiveness of counterfactual thinking 
(Galinsky and Moskowitz 2000). Since the SIAM model indicates that new ideas are generated 
based on activated domain specific knowledge, counterfactual primes can improve idea 
generation to the extent that the auditor possesses additional relevant, yet unconsidered, 
knowledge. 
 When auditing a familiar account or transaction, auditors are likely to access a very small 
subset of their auditing knowledge due to strong problem-knowledge links from repeatedly 
auditing similar transactions in a standardized way. These links can be difficult to break through 
effort alone due to their subconscious nature as evidenced by auditors’ difficulty in a similar 
task, alternative hypothesis generation during analytical review procedures (Heiman 1990). I 
predict that priming a counterfactual mindset will aid in the activation of a wider range of task 
relevant knowledge and help auditors generate ideas in familiar audit tasks (Galinsky and 
Moskowitz 2000). Since standardized procedures are displayed prominently in the audit 
workplace through prior year work (e.g., Wright 1988; Low 2004) and regulator or firm 
guidance (e.g., Kennedy et al. 1997) it is important to investigate whether the predicted benefit 
of priming counterfactual thinking is robust to the presence of suggested example provision. I 
propose that it is not the suggested example itself, but rather it is the creation of a cognitive 
barrier from repeatedly using the same examples to audit familiar transactions in the same way 
that suppresses idea generation. Therefore, to the extent that the example is different from the 
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individual auditor’s most common response, it will also be beneficial to idea generation through 
prompting a new line of knowledge search, but to a lesser extent than the wider knowledge 
search prompted by priming a counterfactual mindset (Nijstad et al. 2002; Nijstad and Strobe 
2006). 
 When auditing an unfamiliar account or transaction, auditors are likely to encounter a 
different knowledge search challenge in attempting to identify what portions of their vast 
auditing knowledge are most relevant to the problem at hand. Here the issue for the auditor 
becomes narrowing the search of their knowledge to the most relevant audit related knowledge 
and therefore widening the search with a counterfactual mindset will likely be of limited value 
until the search becomes better defined. When examining an unfamiliar task that contains an 
example solution, a counterfactual mindset will increase auditors’ focus on task-embedded cues 
and decrease the search for outside, related knowledge (Kray et al. 2006).  The resulting ideas 
will be more similar to the example and less diverse overall. The provision of a standardized 
example in the absence of a counterfactual mindset, however, will be beneficial because it can 
act as a search cue that helps direct auditors toward relevant audit knowledge that would have 
otherwise remained untapped (Nijstad et al. 2002; Nijstad and Strobe 2006) 
 In a 2 x 2 x 2 experiment using audit professionals, I manipulate task (less familiar versus 
more familiar), counterfactual mindset prime (prime versus no prime) and example provision 
(present versus absent). Both experimental tasks asked participants to generate as many audit 
evidence ideas as they could for a hypothetical audit scenario. The more familiar case contained 
cues that clearly indicated a need to access revenue related audit knowledge. The less familiar 
case abstracted away from a traditional financial statement audit context and omitted the use of 
many common contextual cues that would indicate what type of audit knowledge would be 
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useful. I manipulate counterfactual mindset by having participants read a story that was designed 
to elicit, or not elicit, counterfactual thoughts prior to performing the audit task as in Galinsky 
and Moskowitz (2000) and Kray et al. (2006). For both tasks, the example, when provided, 
suggested that the auditors obtain data for use in a volume estimate analytical procedure. The 
primary dependent measure is a multidimensional evaluation of idea generation flexibility taken 
from the divergent thinking literature that evaluates the number, breadth, originality, and 
elaborateness of participants’ audit evidence ideas (Guilford 1967; Karakelle 2009; Lewis and 
Lovatt 2013). 
 I find that, in both tasks, auditors not exposed to the example or counterfactual prime 
exercise less flexibility in idea generation than do auditors exposed to the manipulation better 
equipped to combat the knowledge search problem created by the task, despite all auditors 
receiving instructions to generate as many ideas as possible. In the more familiar task the results 
indicate that a counterfactual mindset helps auditors create audit evidence ideas that reflect a 
wider range of their knowledge, but this prompt is not beneficial in the less familiar task. In the 
less familiar case the provision of an example procedure does not inhibit the consideration of 
additional ideas and instead provides benefits of its own. However, these benefits disappear in 
auditors primed with a counterfactual mindset. Examining the overall pattern of results suggests 
that priming a counterfactual mindset is the most beneficial intervention to encourage flexible 
idea generation for a familiar transaction regardless of example presence, but that providing an 
example in isolation is the better approach for unfamiliar tasks. Supplemental analyses also 
suggest that the improved idea generation created by the interventions in the more familiar 
scenario allowed auditors to design more efficient audit programs (i.e., programs that required 
fewer estimated hours to complete). 
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 This study contributes to the auditing literature by introducing flexibility in idea 
generation as a performance measure for audit planning and audit program design. Prior auditing 
research, like the audit firms and other professional organizations, generally has focused 
improving auditor judgment and decision-making by decreasing errors rather than by increasing 
insights (Klein 2013). One exception to this is fraud brainstorming where the idea of flexible 
idea generation is more accepted and encouraged by regulators, audit firms and researchers 
(Carpenter 2007; Hoffman and Zimbelman 2009; Trotman et al. 2009; Chen et al. 2013). Even 
within this work only Trotman et al. (2009) examines the originality of brainstormed frauds as 
benchmarked by other participants rather than ability to identify normatively correct responses. I 
expand and continue this stream of research by introducing a multidimensional idea generation 
measure and examining the benefits of flexible idea generation in additional areas of audit 
planning. 
 My study also complements recent accounting research that considers the 
interdependence of potential interventions (analogous to management controls) both with other 
interventions and with task or environmental characteristics (Grabner and Moers 2013). While 
prior auditing literature often considers decision aids in isolation (e.g., Kennedy 1995, Asare and 
Wright 2004; Carpenter 2007; notable exceptions include Hoffman and Zimbelman 2009 and 
Lynch et al. 2009), my study shows that the effectiveness of a frequently used decision aid, 
counterfactual thinking, depends on the use of other prompts such as example provision, as well 
as task characteristics. 
 Finally, this study also extends the psychology literature in the area of counterfactual 
mindset by identifying two previously unidentified factors, example provision and task 
familiarity, that jointly moderate the effect of a counterfactual mindset in idea generation tasks. 
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The presence of an interaction between counterfactual mindset and task familiarity indicates the 
need for additional idea generation research utilizing professional participants performing tasks 
in their areas of expertise and also highlights the need for additional research of idea generation 
in the audit domain.  
Flexibility in Auditing and Accounting 
 Recent field research indicates that improving professional performance is likely a function 
of both reducing the occurrence of errors and the increasing the generation of insights (Klein 
2013).3 Much of the auditing literature to date, however, focuses on the former and ignores the 
latter (e.g., Libby and Libby 1989; Kachelmeier and Messier 1990; Bedard and Biggs 1991; 
Kennedy 1993; Messier et al. 2008). The fraud brainstorming area is one notable exception in 
which researchers, audit firms, and regulators seem to agree that promoting flexible idea 
generation is beneficial to audit quality.4 The focus almost solely on error reduction outside of 
the fraud identification realm is puzzling given that highly mechanized audits face increased risk 
of audit failure due to predictability of audit procedures allowing management to anticipate what 
will be audited and how (AICPA 2006; PCAOB 2007; IFAC 2009; PCAOB 2010; Budescu et al. 
2012).5 One possible reason for fraud brainstorming’s acceptance as a safe outlet of flexible idea 
generation is the mandate that it occur during the planning stage of the audit. At this time, the 
                                                            
3 The constructs of insight and flexible idea generation are closely related to the construct of creativity. Researchers 
of creativity make the distinction between two different types of creativity that have varying degrees of applicability 
to an accounting and auditing setting. Big C refers to the more rare type of creativity that leads to major 
breakthroughs that are impactful to society. Little c refers to everyday problem solving, divergent thinking and the 
ability to adapt to change (Hennessey and Amabile 2010). The latter form of creativity should be particularly helpful 
to auditors attempting to adapt to the day-to-day challenges of ever changing clients and economic environments 
and is the primary focus of this research. 
4 During fraud brainstorming procedures, auditors generate a list of ideas regarding how management could commit 
fraud. The underlying premise if this exercise is that a longer and more diverse list will result in the design of 
procedures that are more responsive to the overall risk of fraud (Carpenter 2007; Hoffman and Zimbelman 2009; 
Trotman et al. 2009;Hammersley 2011; Chen et al. 2012; Herron 2012). 
5 In fact, even unpredictability that is, predictably, focused only in higher risk areas can unintentionally increase 
management’s ability to predict where auditors will focus their efforts (Bowlin 2011), thus highlighting the potential 
value of more creative unpredictability in audit procedures across the entire engagement. 
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entire audit team comes together to vet ideas, which makes it a controlled environment to vet 
new audit procedures as well. 
 Auditors considering a wider range of potential audit evidence and procedures can provide 
similar benefits to fraud brainstorming through improved ability to respond to changes in 
macroeconomic and auditee specific risk. Research clearly documents a longstanding preference 
by auditors to audit the “same as last year” (Joyce and Biddle 1981; Wright 1988; Asare and 
Wright 2004; Brazel et al. 2004). Theory suggests this repetition of performing the same audit 
year after year can create a subconscious barrier that impairs auditors’ ability to improve existing 
audit procedures and adapt to new developments at individual clients (e.g., process changes or 
new transaction types) or in the business environment as a whole (e.g., advent of big data or the 
housing market crash) (Cardoso and Badke 2011; Arning 2013; Chipman 2013).6, 7 More recent 
literature further indicates that, particularly when facing unusual situations, auditors do not 
display high levels of divergent thinking without prompting (Plumlee et al. 2014). Therefore, the 
goal of promoting flexible idea generation during audit planning is to both increase consideration 
of alternative approaches to auditing old, familiar transactions and also to encourage better 
application of existing audit knowledge to new, unfamiliar transactions. 
 The Search for Ideas in Associative Memory (SIAM) model provides a framework that 
can inform predictions about what types of prompts or circumstances will stimulate flexible idea 
generation. This theory of memory recall is particularly relevant to professional settings as it 
                                                            
6 Robert Arning, Vice Chair of Market Development at KPMG, LLC, gave a presentation in the Fall of 2013 where 
he stressed the importance his firm has placed on hiring creative people that will be able to keep up with increasing 
levels of innovation that the firm is seeing in their current and potential clients. Similarly, Stephen Chipman, Chief 
Executive Officer at Grant Thornton, LLP echoed Arning’s sentiments at the 2013 American Accounting 
Association Annual Meeting when he spoke about his concern that auditors are not adapting quickly enough to 
changes in the business environment such as underutilizing Big Data. 
7 In addition to cognitive barriers caused by repetition, auditors face a number of potential obstacles to flexible 
judgment such as lack of individual incentives to design new audit approaches (Peecher et al. 2013), time pressure 
(Bonner 2008), and other subconscious cognitive barriers (e.g., production blocking in Carpenter 2007). 
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describes the process through which an individual interprets a problem and generates new ideas 
based on relevant topical knowledge, as opposed to models that ignore knowledge search and 
rely on other factors such as individual differences in creative ability (Raaijmakers and Shiffrin 
1981; Nijstad et al. 2002; Nijstad and Stroebe 2006; Hennessey and Amabile 2010). Per the 
SIAM model an individual first examines a task for key information that can be used as a search 
cue to activate relevant knowledge and then use features of that activated knowledge to generate 
new ideas. In other words, auditors who are able to activate the greatest amount of task relevant 
knowledge will produce the greatest number and variety of audit evidence ideas for use in audit 
planning. 
 I describe below the challenges of idea generation in higher and lower familiarity tasks 
separately, beginning with the former.8 When attempting to improve procedures the auditor will 
know what accounts the transaction should impact, what technical accounting rules are 
applicable and what audit procedures have been used in the past. These details of the task act as 
search cues that easily link the transaction description to relevant audit knowledge about how to 
approach the audit task. Difficulties in generating ideas, for these familiar tasks, stem from the 
existence of strong cue-knowledge-idea links from repeatedly auditing similar transactions in the 
same way (Figure 1, Panel A) (Nijstad and Stroebe 2006). Strong links of this type will suppress 
other knowledge and new ideas from coming to mind, thus prompts that increase the breadth of 
knowledge accessed by a search cue will likely increase the flexibility of idea generation.  
                                                            
8 Familiarity is a construct that takes on many names in the accounting and psychology literature. For example, 
psychology has looked at situations in which experts face tasks in which the content is relevant to their area of 
expertise, but a lack of contextual information obscures this connection and inhibits memory search formation 
(Tversky 1977; Einhorn and Hogarth 1981). In accounting, the ease with which task cues can be linked to previously 
stored knowledge is called input clarity. In other words, a task with higher input clarity possesses a greater degree of 
similarity between the task cues and prior knowledge (Bonner 1994; Chen et al. 2014). 
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 Alternatively, auditors can encounter a transaction that is unfamiliar to them and they 
must work hard to interpret the problem and form a search cue.9 Ill-formed search cues, ones that 
do not properly interpret the problem and identify the type of knowledge needed, will likely call 
to mind knowledge that is irrelevant to the problem at hand and will block productive idea 
generation (Figure 1, Panel B) (Nijstad and Stroebe 2006). When irrelevant knowledge interferes 
with idea generation then prompts that are able to refine the search cue and facilitate accesses of 
a more appropriate subset of knowledge will likely increase the flexibility of idea generation. In 
sum, both familiar and unfamiliar tasks pose challenges to idea generation due to sub-optimal 
knowledge activation: (1) more familiar tasks activate knowledge that is too narrow and 
typically confined to previously learned routines and (2) less familiar tasks activate knowledge 
that is too broad and not confined to relevant topics. 
Counterfactual Mindset Prime 
 Prompts to engage in counterfactual thinking have a well-documented effect of 
increasing the consideration of alternatives in both accounting and psychology research, making 
them a prime candidate for expanding activated knowledge. Counterfactual thinking is a form of 
mental simulation in which individuals use their imagination to consider what could have been in 
the past or what will be in the future (i.e., construct a mental scenario that is different from the 
current reality). The benefits of prompting counterfactual thought include increased 
                                                            
9 In 15 semi-structured interviews, I conducted with practicing professionals participants spoke about situations they 
encountered that were either novel to them, their team, and/or the firm as a whole. One participant spoke about the 
difficulties in auditing and disclosing revenues associated with Facebook games because the best application of 
revenue recognition rules is unclear for such an intangible environment. Similarly, another interviewee spoke about 
a securities lending transaction that was quite simple to account for until the financial crisis resulted in the collateral, 
which was similar to a money market account where the net asset value is typically stable at one dollar, dropping 
below that valuation benchmark and requiring the audit client to add cash to the account. There was no standard 
audit plan available for use in this situation as the circumstances were not widely anticipated and continuing to audit 
according to the standard plan would have ignored the enhanced risk of the transaction under current market 
conditions. These examples provide evidence that auditors do encounter transactions that are low in familiarity 
during the course of their audits. 
37 
consideration of disconfirmatory evidence (Kray and Galinsky 2003), increased sharing of 
information in groups (Galinsky and Kray 2004), decreased effects of the curse of knowledge 
(i.e., the inability to disregard information already processed when it would be beneficial to do 
so) (Kennedy 1995) and increased skepticism of management’s non-error explanations for 
analytical review procedures (Koonce 1992).10 In all of these studies, prompts to actively think 
about a situation counterfactually made the participants less apt to follow their initial response 
and to instead incorporate a greater amount of information and knowledge into their judgments. 
 Auditors already attempting to generate potential audit evidence ideas will likely not be 
greatly influenced by a conscious prompt to think counterfactually and consider alternatives, as 
that is already their primary objective. Low and Tan (2011) find that instructions simply asking 
auditors to “think outside of the box” do not induce modifications to audit procedures in the 
absence of time pressure, which is typical of the environment during the planning stage of the 
audit.11 The SIAM model indicates that this is likely due, in part, to common search cues and 
knowledge become linked in memory such that the repeated use of a search cue will 
subconsciously block the retrieval of different knowledge (Nijstad and Stroebe 2006). This 
theory is consistent with prior findings that auditors have difficultly generating multiple 
explanations during analytic procedures, even when instructed directly to do so (Heiman 1990). 
Psychology research has shown that an alternative form of the counterfactual prompt, priming a 
counterfactual mindset, is more successful at prompting the consideration of alternatives where 
                                                            
10 Counterfactual thinking encompasses any consideration of an alternate reality, or thoughts of what might have 
been under different conditions. One technique use to elicit counterfactual thought is counterexplanation. 
Counterexplanation requires individuals to assume their initial response is incorrect and consider why that might be 
true. This is the method of prompting counterfactual thought used by Koonce (1992), Kennedy (1995), and Kadous 
et al. (2006). This active form of counterfactual thinking differs from the passive counterfactual mindset used in this 
study. 
11 The observation that the combination of “think outside of the box” instructions plus time pressure was necessary 
to result in revisions to the audit plan is a good example of what Klein (2013) describes as creative desperation, or 
insight coming to an individual in their time of need. 
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conscious attempts to do so fail (Galinsky et al. 2000). Consistent with literature in psychology 
in this area, I define a mindset as “a cluster of cognitive processes that are well-learned because 
they serve a functional purpose” (Galinsky et al. 2000, p256). Activation of these well-learned 
processes creates a change in cognitive processing style that carries over into subsequent, 
unrelated tasks (Smallman and Roese 2009).12 For example, priming a counterfactual mindset 
helps mitigate the phenomenon of functional fixedness, or the tendency to focus on an object’s 
most common use to the extent that other potential uses cannot be called to mind (Galinsky and 
Moskowitz 2000).13  
 Recall that auditors designing audit procedures for a familiar transaction will have 
difficulty due to constrained knowledge search resulting from strong cue-knowledge-idea links 
(Figure 1, Panel A). A familiar transaction brings to mind a specific set of audit evidence that the 
auditor has obtained successfully in the past and that suppress the consideration of further 
alternatives, similar to the problem of functional fixedness. Therefore, to the extent that a prompt 
facilitates the access of a wider range of task-related knowledge it will enable auditors to 
consider a more flexible set of potential audit evidence (Figure 2, Panel A).  
                                                            
12 Consistent with the Galinsky et al. (2000) definition of mindset can relate to a variety of information processing 
styles that an individual acquires over time. A counterfactual mindset is just one of many mindsets used in the 
accounting literature. Griffith et al. (2014) study deliberative vs. implemental mindsets. While these two mindsets 
form a natural dichotomy, not all mindsets are related to each other or can be placed on a continuum in this manner. 
Other mindsets used in accounting are low-level and high-level construal mindsets from construal-level theory of 
psychological distance (Trope and Liberman 2010). Again, these mindsets form a dichotomy, but are unrelated to 
the counterfactual mindset, which is the topic of this study. 
13 The most famous of tasks illustrating this phenomenon, and the one chosen Galinsky and Moskowitz (2000), is 
the Duncker candle task. In this task, participants receive a box of thumbtacks and a candle along with instructions 
that they are to use these materials to affix the candle to the wall. To successfully complete this task, participants 
must remove the pushpins from their container, and realize that they can then use container itself as a stand for the 
candle. Participants were more likely to successfully complete this task after reading a story designed to elicit 
counterfactual thoughts and subsequently a counterfactual mindset. The story described a woman named Jane who 
attends a concert at which a member of the audience wins a free trip to Hawaii based on seat number. In the version 
of the story designed to elicit counterfactual thoughts Jane switches seats just prior to the announcement of the 
winning seat, but does not switch seats in the non-counterfactual conditions. In both conditions, Jane wins the trip to 
Hawaii. 
39 
 In unfamiliar tasks it is less clear that priming a counterfactual mindset will be beneficial 
to idea generation since auditors need help focusing their knowledge search to relevant audit 
topics. Although it is possible that activating a wider range of knowledge is more likely to call to 
mind any knowledge that can be applied to the problem at hand, it seems more plausible that in a 
professional setting that an undirected broadening of activated knowledge will further interfere 
with the identification of relevant knowledge. For example, completion of an audit planning task 
requires the access of specific domain knowledge such as relevant accounting standards and 
auditing assertions (e.g., Vera-Muñoz et al. 2001). Therefore, I predict that in unfamiliar tasks 
that require specialized knowledge, prompting a counterfactual mindset will result in a broad, 
undirected search that is unlikely to yield knowledge that is applicable to the problem at hand 
(Figure 2, Panel A). I combine the differential benefits of priming a counterfactual mindset in the 
hypothesized interaction below (Figure 3): 
H1: A counterfactual mindset will improve the flexibility of audit evidence idea 
generation when a task is familiar, but will reduce or have no effect on audit evidence 
idea generation when a task is unfamiliar. 
 
The Moderating Effect of Examples 
 Due to the prominence of recommended, or standardized, auditing procedures throughout 
audit firm and regulatory guidance, it is important to consider the robustness of the effects of a 
counterfactual mindset prime in this environment.14 Research in engineering design shows that 
provision of an example can act as an anchor that limits the flexibility of ideas regarding other 
audit evidence that could be considered (Jansson and Smith 1991).15 Several studies similarly 
                                                            
14 The investigation of the joint effects of a counterfactual mindset prime and the provision of an example is closely 
related to recent calls for greater research on management control practices that consider the complementarity 
between controls and interventions acting as a system (Grabner and Moers 2013). 
15 The group brainstorming literature has documented several other detrimental effects of example provision, or idea 
sharing, on creativity and productivity (Dennis and Valacich 1993; Carpenter 2007; Lynch et al. 2009) that I believe 
are less concerning to an individual setting. One cause of these findings is production blocking, or cognitive 
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show that auditors anchor on prior year audit programs through reluctance to remove procedures 
from the audit program, but they do not hesitate to add additional work to the program indicating 
inherited programs are likely less sticky than self designs (Wright 1988; Biggs et al. 1988; 
Hammersley et al. 2011).16 Therefore, to the extent that an example audit procedure is 
sufficiently different from the individual’s own ideas it can be quite beneficial to the generation 
of further ideas (Nijstad et al. 2003). Below I will consider the joint effects of a counterfactual 
mindset prime and example provision on unfamiliar and familiar audit planning tasks 
respectively. 
Unfamiliar Tasks 
 Recall that for unfamiliar tasks a counterfactual mindset will not help auditors narrow 
their knowledge search to relevant topics. When the task is unfamiliar the determination of what 
information is the most appropriate for that memory search can be very effort intensive (Nijstad 
et al. 2002; Nijstad and Stroebe 2006).17 To the extent that the auditor can use an example as a 
search cue to more easily link the unfamiliar task to existing audit knowledge, the provision of 
an example will improve idea generation. Although an example has the potential to serve as a 
search cue in isolation, a counterfactual mindset will block the recognition of the example as a 
potential search cue. 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
interference, which occurs when outside ideas cause individuals to lose their train of thought and prematurely abort 
the cue-idea cycle (Diehl and Stroebe 1987; Stroebe et al. 2010). 
16 While these studies do not investigate the extent to which auditor program modifications are flexible, they do 
provide some assurance that auditors are unlikely to rely solely on the example without bringing their own 
experiences to bear on the task. 
17 Low (2004) finds that auditors with greater industry expertise are more likely to respond to changes in risks by 
changing procedures used in a prior year audit than are auditors with less expertise. These findings are consistent 
with SIAM in that experts can more easily process the task information into search cues and will subsequently 
retrieve more relevant knowledge, thus yielding benefits to idea generation. Low does not investigate the type of 
procedure changes so his study cannot speak to the creativity of the revised procedures directly, although his 
findings imply that industry experts would likely be able to produce a larger number of ideas, one component of 
divergent thought measured in the psychology literature, than non-experts (Guildford 1967). 
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 In addition to increasing the consideration of alternatives, psychology research shows that 
counterfactual primes also improve the consideration of relationships between task-embedded 
cues (Kray et al. 2006). In an audit planning context this means that the counterfactual mindset 
will reinforce the link between the task and the example (i.e., emphasize the problem-idea link) 
such that it creates a fixation on the example as the answer, rather than as a search cue.18 
Research on counterfactual thinking and creativity in psychology finds that priming a 
counterfactual mindset can have detrimental, rather than beneficial or even neutral, effect on idea 
generation tasks containing examples (Kray et al. 2006).19 However, unlike participants in those 
studies who possessed no expertise related to the task, auditors will eventually recognize the 
value of the example as a search cue and use it to access relevant knowledge, but delays in 
beginning this process will negate the benefits of example provision (Figure 2, Panel B). I make 
the following prediction regarding the joint effect of examples and counterfactual mindset for 
unfamiliar task (Figure 4, Panel A): 
H2a: For unfamiliar tasks, idea generation will be highest when an example is present 
and the auditor has a counterfactual mindset and least when an example is absent and the 
auditor does not have a counterfactual mindset or when the auditor has a counterfactual 
mindset, regardless of example provision. 
 
Familiar Tasks 
 Recall that for familiar tasks a counterfactual mindset will help auditors widen their 
knowledge search beyond typical audit procedures learned through repetitive use. An example 
provided by firm or regulator guidance will expand auditors' knowledge search to the extent that 
any one particular example is sufficiently different enough from their own ideas to activate 
                                                            
18 Focusing on relationships between task embedded information is also less cognitively taxing than engaging in the 
more difficult task of searching for relevant outside knowledge to apply (Nijstad and Stroebe 2006). 
19 The primary task used in this work was a product label idea generation task that always included the provision of 
an example response in the task materials and used psychology student subjects, who were likely unfamiliar with the 
field of advertising. 
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previously inaccessible knowledge (Nijstad et al. 2003). Therefore, the benefit of a 
counterfactual mindset prime provides the greater benefit to idea generation because it will 
activate more knowledge in all auditors, regardless of individual auditors' idiosyncratic standard 
responses, but an example will activate new knowledge only when sufficiently different from 
that standard response. Since auditors will not need to rely on the example as a search cue in 
familiar tasks, the benefits of the counterfactual mindset prime on idea generation will be robust 
to example presence (Figure 2, Panel B). I make the following prediction regarding the joint 
effect of examples and counterfactual mindset for familiar tasks (Figure 4, Panel B): 
H2b: For familiar tasks, idea generation will be highest when the auditor has a 
counterfactual mindset, regardless of example presence, lower when an example is 
present and the auditor does not have a counterfactual mindset, and least when an 
example is absent and the auditor does not have a counterfactual mindset. 
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IV. STUDY 2: EXPERIMENTAL METHOD 
 I test my hypotheses in a 2 x 2 x 2 between subjects experiment that presented 
participants with a hypothetical audit procedure design task. I manipulate task (higher familiarity 
versus lower familiarity), counterfactual mindset (counterfactual versus no counterfactual) and 
example (present versus absent). The participants were professional auditors with two to five 
years of experience and a rank of senior/in-charge or higher. Participants with this level of 
experience are appropriate for this task as they likely have experience designing or modifying 
audit procedures. In all conditions, participants completed a short thought exercise containing the 
counterfactual mindset manipulation before completing the primary task. The task required 
participants to read a short description of a hypothetical audit engagement and to list potential 
audit evidence items that they could obtain for the purposes of designing an audit program for a 
portion of that engagement. Figure 5 provides an outline of the experimental procedures. The 
author and a second independent researcher coded participant responses for four different 
attributes of idea generation: (1) the number of audit evidence ideas, (2) the breadth of audit 
evidence ideas, (3) the originality of the ideas relative to other participants, and (4) the degree of 
specification provided for each evidence idea. 
Independent Variables 
Task 
 The primary experimental task described for each participant one of two hypothetical 
audit engagements, manipulated between subjects, for which participants would be generating 
audit evidence ideas. The lower familiarity task was a case in which audit knowledge was 
applicable (i.e., the case contained audit content), but lacked a traditional auditing setting that 
participants could use to determine which portion of their knowledge would be most relevant 
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(i.e., the case lacked audit context) (Burns and Stalker 1961; Einhorn and Hogarth 1981; Bonner 
1994). In this case participants identified audit evidence that could be obtained when auditing the 
number of golf balls that fit inside a school bus. The most relevant audit knowledge would likely 
be that related to auditing inventory accounts, however, the word inventory did not appear in the 
text of the case and no other details of the case were obviously inventory related. The higher 
familiarity task was a case where audit knowledge was applicable (i.e., the case contained audit 
content) and the setting provided clear contextual cues that participants could use to determine 
which portion of their knowledge would be most relevant (i.e., the case contained audit context)  
(Burns and Stalker 1961; Einhorn and Hogarth 1981; Bonner 1994). In this case participants 
identified audit evidence that could be obtained when auditing the revenue of a bridge tollbooth. 
The most relevant audit knowledge would be that related to auditing revenue accounts, which is 
quite salient due to the presence of the word revenue and other details of the case description. 
Both tasks are provided in their entirety in Figure 6, Panels B and C (see Appendix C for full 
experimental materials). 
Counterfactual Mindset 
 In all conditions the instructions direct participants to list as many responses as they can, 
but the SIAM indicates that difficulties in retrieving diverse knowledge related to an individual 
search cue will be largely subconscious and prompts that again ask participants directly to 
consider alternatives to their initial response will likely be largely ineffectual. I prime a 
counterfactual mindset that will subconsciously influence subsequent cognition while 
participants complete the audit case. The counterfactual manipulation precedes the audit task and 
example manipulation for two reasons: (1) a mindset is by definition a state of mind that carries 
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over from a previous, unrelated task; and (2) a mindset influences information processing is 
therefore most influential when introduced prior to first consideration of the task. 
 Consistent with the related psychology literature, the mindset prime in the counterfactual 
condition asks participants to read a story designed to illicit counterfactual thoughts and to write 
down what thoughts the protagonist might be having (Figure 6, Panel A). In the story a woman 
named Jane attends a rock concert where a free trip to Hawaii is given to a member of the 
audience based on their seat number. In the counterfactual version of the story Jane switches 
seats just prior to winning the trip, thus Jane might be thinking thoughts such as, “If I had not 
switched seats, I would not have won the trip.” The no counterfactual condition is identical to the 
counterfactual condition except that Jane does not switch seats prior to winning the trip. For a 
manipulation check, participants responded to a true or false question asking whether or not Jane 
switched seats in the story they read. Six (4.3%) participants failed this manipulation check with 
four of the six reporting that Jane had switched seats when she had not.20 
Example Presence 
 I manipulate example provision by adding (omitting) a sentence at the end of the case 
materials that provides an example item of audit evidence and an example audit procedure that 
would incorporate that item of evidence. The example manipulation occurs after the 
counterfactual mindset manipulation so that it is processed as a part of the task and with the 
counterfactual mindset, when primed. The example also appears at the end of the case so that it 
has more meaning in the experimental context, since participants have no prior knowledge of the 
hypothetical audit client. In a real life audit setting an example might be presented before, 
                                                            
20 The counterfactual mindset manipulation occurred before the audit task and is therefore unlikely to be influenced 
by the other two manipulated variables contained in that audit task. Accordingly, I observe a distribution of 
counterfactual mindset manipulation check failures that do not statistically differ across cases (higher familiarity = 
4.3%; lower familiarity = 4.3%; Z < 0.01; p = 1.000, two-tailed) and example conditions (example = 1.5%; no 
example = 7.1%; Z = 1.75; p = 0.102, two-tailed). 
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during, or after the review of critical task details. However, as long as the example is considered 
with the same mindset as the other task information there is no theoretical reason to believe that 
the two manipulated factors will interact differently that the hypothesized pattern of results. 
 The example provided for the school bus (lower familiarity) case was to obtain the 
dimensions of the school bus for use in an analytical procedure that would estimate how many 
golf balls could fit in the bus. The example provided for the tollbooth (higher familiarity) case 
was to obtain the average daily traffic flow across the bridge for use in an analytical procedure to 
estimate the expected annual revenues. In the no example condition the sentence containing the 
example was omitted from the case.  
 The nature of the example will, of course, influence the effectiveness of this 
manipulation. I select a fairly common, non-account specific example, which I believe biases 
against finding results since more common examples are more likely to have already been 
considered by participants. Providing a less typical example, theory predicts, would likely 
amplify the predicted effects, but not change the overall shape of the interaction (Njistad et al. 
2003). The example manipulations are included in Figure 5, Panels B and C. For a manipulation 
check participants responded to a true or false question containing the example audit evidence 
that asked whether that sentence appeared in their case materials. Twenty-three (16.7%) 
participants failed the manipulation check with 13 of the 23 reporting that they had seen the 
example when they had not.21 
Dependent Variables 
 My primary dependent variable is a composite measure of the quantity and quality of 
audit evidence ideas generated that is based upon the scoring system utilized by Guilford’s 
                                                            
21 I do not observe an effect of case (higher familiarity = 17.4%; lower familiarity = 15.9%; Z = 0.23; p = 0.819, 
two-tailed) or counterfactual mindset (counterfactual = 17.6%; no counterfactual = 15.7%; Z = -0.31; p = 0.761, 
two-tailed) on whether or not participants failed the example manipulation check question. 
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Alternate Uses Task (1967). The alternative uses task asks participants to name various possible 
uses for a common object such as a brick or a paperclip and scoring of responses evaluates four 
different dimensions: fluency, breadth elaboration, and originality.22 The author and an 
independent second coder, who were both blind to the experimental condition, coded each audit 
evidence idea for these four criteria. Prior literature in creativity or divergent thinking typically 
assumes that these components together measure a single construct (e.g., Karakelle 2009; Lewis 
and Lovatt 2013). The SIAM literature indicates that while taken together these measures should 
indicate better idea generation overall, each measure individually represents a more specific 
aspect of the idea generation construct on its own. Fluency measures productivity through 
volume of ideas; breadth measures content through diversity of ideas; and elaboration and 
originality measure quality through specificity and uniqueness of ideas respectively (Stroebe et 
al. 2010). 
 While these attributes of idea generation are well established in the creativity and 
brainstorming literature, it is not necessarily obvious how they equate to benefits in audit 
program design so I consider each in turn. The objective of audit planning is to ultimately design 
audit procedures that maximize the persuasiveness, and thus sufficiency, of evidence collected 
while also maximizing efficiency to the greatest extent possible. Auditors with a greater number 
and variety of audit evidence items to chose from should be more successful in this endeavor. 
Additionally, choosing new items or having a greater number of evidence items to alternate 
between will help auditors provide unpredictability in procedures. Therefore, fluency and 
breadth are relevant to the audit setting. In audit procedure design, specificity is very important, 
particularly when auditing judgmental areas. For example, a bank statement obtained from the 
                                                            
22 Guildford’s Alternate Uses Test (1967) refers to breadth as flexibility and the SIAM literature refers to breadth as 
idea diversity (Stroebe et al. 2010). 
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auditee is less persuasive than a bank statement obtained directly from the bank. If no source 
were specified in the audit program then the effectiveness of the work step could be jeopardized. 
Therefore, elaboration is relevant to the audit setting. However, while original ideas are 
necessary for big picture process improvements it is not the case creating audit procedures from 
a set of highly original audit evidence, that omits unoriginal evidence such as bank statements, 
will lead to better audit procedures. 
 I perform a factor analysis on these four dimensions and find that they in fact load on two 
different factors with eigenvalues of greater than one. Three components (factor loading): 
fluency (.93), breadth (.75), and elaboration (.85) load on the first factor, which I refer to as idea 
generation. The remaining component of originality loads in isolation on the second factor. The 
idea generation factor contains the components that are most critical to day-to-day success of 
audit procedure design in the ability to generate volume, breath and specificity of ideas. 
Originality, by contrast, is more critical to the evolution of new methods of auditing and future 
process improvements. I perform tests of my hypotheses on both a composite measure 
representing the idea generation factor as well as the originality factor (see Figures 7 and 8 for 
example responses). I describe each of the four measures individually in greater detail below. 
Fluency 
 Fluency measures the quantity of evidence ideas that a participant identifies. Each 
evidence idea listed by the participant that is distinctly different from the other evidence ideas 
listed by that same participant received one point. Nonsensical responses or responses that 
referred to parts of the audit that were outside the scope of the experimental task received no 
points. The final fluency score for each participant is the sum of all points assigned for evidence 
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ideas identified. The coder agreement for the fluency measure was 89.0% and all disagreements 
were mutually resolved. 
Breadth 
 Breadth measures the variety of evidence types included in a participant’s idea set. I define 
the different categories of possible audit evidence based on the types of audit evidence listed in 
the AICPA auditing standards (AU section 326). These categories include inspection of 
documents, inspection of tangible items, observation, inquiry, confirmation, recalculation, 
reperformance, analytical procedures and scanning. The two coders mapped each evidence idea 
provided by participants to one of these nine categories. Participants received one point for each 
category in which they had listed at least one evidence idea. The final breadth score for each 
participant is the sum of all categories of audit evidence utilized across their responses. The 
coder agreement for the breadth measure was 86.1% and all disagreements were mutually 
resolved. 
Elaboration 
 The elaboration dimension measures the amount of detail that the participant includes in 
their response. The coders assigned one point per modifier or additional detail provided that 
elaborates on the idea generated. For example, in the lower familiarity (school bus) case if the 
participant simply identified the school bus itself as an item of audit evidence that would receive 
no elaboration points. However, if the participant identified the school bus itself and elaborated 
that the purpose of examining this evidence was to measuring the interior dimensions of the bus 
then the response would receive one point of elaboration. The final elaboration score is the sum 
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of all elaboration points awarded across all items of evidence identified. The coder agreement for 
the elaboration measure was 76.6% and all disagreements were mutually resolved.23 
Originality 
 Originality measures the uniqueness of the response relative to the entire pool of 
participants such that rare responses receive a higher score than common responses. Since 
responses were often case specific, comparisons are made only to other participants in the same 
familiarity condition. Specifically, I assign points to responses that were identified by fewer than 
15% or fewer respondents. Since approximately 70 participants completed each case this results 
in participants receiving at least one point for any response indicated by ten or fewer other 
participants. The scoring system provided more points to more uncommon responses such that 
responses given by only one participant received ten points; responses given by only two 
participants received nine points, etc. The final originality score for each participant is the sum of 
all points assigned for responses indicated by 15% or fewer respondents and divided by the 
participants fluency scores.24 Scaling by fluency was necessary to prevent contamination of the 
measure based on response volume. For example, a participant who gave ten responses each 
earning a single originality point should not be considered equally original to a participant that 
gave a single, truly unique response. The originality measure was computed based off of the 
evidence idea names assigned by the coders and used to compute the fluency measure, no further 
coding was performed specifically for this measure. 
  
                                                            
23 The majority of the disagreements (88.0%) represent coder responses within a range of plus or minus one of each 
other and the simple correlation between raters was 0.72. 
24 Results are robust to alternative cut-off points for receiving originality points, such as awarding points only to 
responses given by 5% or fewer of respondents. 
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V. STUDY 2: RESULTS 
Participants 
 Participants in this study were 138 experienced audit professionals from two Big 4 audit 
firms recruited during firm organized meetings. These subjects all held the rank of senior/in-
charge and had on average (standard deviation) 3.2 (1.2) years of auditing experience in a wide 
range of client industries. Posttest questions inquiring of the frequency with which participants 
encountered situations requiring audit program modifications and how much experience they had 
in such situations indicate that the participants possessed adequate professional experience to 
complete the experimental task. Participates indicated that on average (standard deviation), 6.2 
(1.9) on a nine-point scale (1 = Very little extent; 9 = Very great extent), they agreed with the 
statement, “I often encounter situations in which I must modify an existing audit program.” They 
also reported possessing at least moderate experience in designing and modifying audit 
procedures, rating their experience on average (standard deviation) at 5.8 (1.9) also on a nine 
point scale (1 = No experience; 9 = Extensive experience). Finally, on average (standard 
deviation) participants reported that they believed they were able to add value to the audit in the 
past when they were required to design or modify audit procedures.25 Overall, these measures 
indicate that participants had sufficient professional and task specific experience. 
Test of Hypotheses 
Joint Effect of Counterfactual Mindset and Task 
Participants’ idea generation scores are tabulated in Table 13 and illustrated graphically 
in Figures 9 and 10. The idea generation scores provided in Table 13 reflect the factor composite 
score that combines the fluency, breadth, and elaboration measures. I include time spent to 
                                                            
25 Participants rated their belief that they were able to add value to the audit through audit program modification on a 
nine-point scale where the end points were labeled 1 = Very little extent and 9 = Very great extent as an average 
(standard deviation) of 6.8 (1.4). 
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complete the task as a covariate in the ANCOVA model to control for effort that the participant 
exerted on the task (Table 14, Panel A). None of the experimental manipulations individually or 
jointly had a significant impact on the amount of time participants took to complete the task. 
Recall that H1 predicts that a counterfactual mindset will improve audit evidence idea generation 
when familiarity is higher, but not when familiarity is lower (Figure 3). I find a significant 
interaction of counterfactual mindset and familiarity (F1,129 = 5.56; p = 0.010, one-tailed) (shown 
graphically as Figure 9). Follow-up simple effects tests show a significant positive effect of 
counterfactual mindset given higher familiarity  (F1, 129 = 4.66; p = 0.017, one-tailed) and a non-
significant negative effect of counterfactual mindset given lower familiarity (F1, 129 = 1.42; p = 
0.236, two-tailed) (Table 14, Panel B).26 Therefore, H1 is supported for the overall idea 
generation measure.  
Originality scores are provided in Table 15. The disordinal interaction of familiarity and 
counterfactual mindset is not significant (F1, 129 = 0.95; p = 0.331, two-tailed) (Table 16, Panel 
A). Follow-up simple effects tests show a non-significant negative effect of counterfactual 
mindset given higher familiarity (F1, 129 = 1.48; p = 0.226, two-tailed) and a non-significant 
negative effect of counterfactual mindset given lower familiarity (F1, 129 = 0.03; p = 0.863, two-
tailed) (Table 16, Panel B). Therefore, H1 is not supported for the originality measure.  
Overall, I find that priming a counterfactual mindset improves overall idea generation in 
familiar settings, but does not influence the originality of those ideas generated. This likely due 
to the fact that having a highly original set of audit evidence ideas is not necessarily indicative of 
                                                            
26 These results are robust to the inclusion of audit firm as a factor in the ANCOVA model. Interestingly, I find an 
unpredicted three-way interaction of firm, familiarity and example (F1,129 = 4.47; p = 0.036, two-tailed) in which 
the example provided the greatest benefit to auditors from Firm 2 in the less familiar case. This is likely because 
employees of the same audit firm will have been exposed to more similar standard procedures than will auditors 
from different firms. Since an example is most beneficial when it is dissimilar from previous experiences, I 
conjecture that the particular example used in the less familiar task was more dissimilar to standard procedures 
employed by Firm 2 than by Firm 1. 
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a higher quality idea generation, as is assumed in the idea generation literature as a whole. For 
example, some forms of very common audit evidence such as third party confirmations are likely 
critical to most audit engagements and ignoring this type of evidence in favor of something more 
original, unless it provided equally strong assurance of existence, could impair audit quality. I, 
therefore, conclude that H1 is supported. 
Joint Effect of Counterfactual Thinking and Example Provision 
 H2 predicts a three-way interaction that is comprised of two two-way ordinal interactions 
of counterfactual mindset and example provision that are moderated by task (Figure 4). Since the 
traditional ANOVA three-way interaction term tests for disordinal interactions it is not a good 
test of my predictions. Additionally, my theory does not allow me to predict a directional main 
effect of task familiarity such that I can contrast code the full three-way interaction. Instead, I 
test the two ordinal interactions individually using contrast codes representing the specific 
pattern of predicted results (Buckless and Ravenscroft 1990). H2a predicts that when familiarity 
is lower an example will benefit idea generation greatly, but priming a counterfactual mindset 
will negate these benefits in addition to providing no benefit when prompted in isolation (Figure 
4, Panel A). H2b predicts that when familiarity is higher an example will benefit idea generation 
moderately, but priming a counterfactual mindset will provide the greatest benefit regardless of 
example presence (Figure 4, Panel B). 
 When familiarity is lower (H2a), I find a significant interaction of counterfactual mindset 
and example for idea generation as presented in Table 14, Panel C and illustrated in Figure 10, 
Panel A (F1, 129 = 50.96; p < 0.001, one-tailed).27 Simple effects follow up tests (not tabulated) 
show a marginally significant benefit of example provision in the absence of a counterfactual 
                                                            
27 An alternative, also theory consistent, contrast codes of absent/no counterfactual (+1), present/no counterfactual 
(+3), absent/counterfactual (-2), and present/counterfactual (-2) are also significant (F1, 129 = 35.86; p < 0.001, one-
tailed). 
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mindset (F1, 129 = 1.66; p = 0.100, one-tailed) and a marginally significant negative effect of 
counterfactual mindset in the presence of an example (F1, 129 = 1.87; p = 0.087, one-tailed). The 
significant ordinal interaction and weakly supporting simple effects support the predictions of 
H2a for the overall idea generation dependent variable. However, the originality variable does 
not display the predicted pattern of results and instead suggests a (non-significant) positive effect 
of any prompts individually or in combination (Table 16, Panel C). Therefore, in less familiar 
tasks the provision of an example is beneficial to overall idea generation, but not originality and 
only when the idea generator is not in a counterfactual mindset. 
 When familiarity is higher (H2b), I find a significant interaction of counterfactual 
mindset and example for idea generation as presented in Table 14, Panel C and illustrated in 
Figure 10, Panel B (F1, 129 = 22.08; p < 0.001, one-tailed).28 Simple effects follow up tests (not 
tabulated) show a significant effect of counterfactual mindset in the absence of an example (F1, 
129 = 3.63; p = 0.030, one-tailed), but non-significant effects of counterfactual mindset in the 
presence of an example (F1, 129 = 1.32; p = 0.127, one-tailed) and example in the absence of 
counterfactual (F1, 129 = 1.17; p = 0.141, one-tailed).29 The significant ordinal interaction and 
supporting simple effect of counterfactual in the absence of example support the predictions of 
H2b for the overall idea generation dependent variable. However, the originality variable does 
not display the predicted pattern of results and instead suggests a (non-significant) detrimental 
effect of a counterfactual mindset on originality in more familiar settings (Table 16, Panel C). 
Therefore, in more familiar tasks the counterfactual mindset prompt is beneficial to overall idea 
generation, but not originality, regardless of example presence.  
                                                            
28 An alternative, also theory consistent, contrast codes of absent/no counterfactual (-3), present/no counterfactual 
(+1), absent/counterfactual (+1), and present/counterfactual (+1) are also significant (F1, 129 = 4.64; p = 0.017, one-
tailed). 
29 These results, although weaker in the simple effects tests, are robust to firm effects. 
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 Overall, I find results consistent with my predictions for general idea generation, but not 
the originality of those ideas generated. As discussed previously, this likely due to the originality 
measure not being indicative of idea set quality when it suppresses more routine, yet desirable, 
ideas. I, therefore, conclude that both H2a and H2b are supported. 
Supplemental Analysis Component Measures 
 The primary dependent measure is a factor composite score that combines three coded 
components: fluency, breadth, and elaboration. Although I do not make predictions regarding 
these component measures I analyze them individually for consistency with my predictions and 
indications of whether one or more of the measures drive the observed idea generation results. I 
find that fluency (i.e., the number of ideas) and elaboration (i.e., the level of idea specification), 
which are the only two of the dimensions coded that do not compare participants against an 
outside standard (i.e., audit evidence categories and other participant responses) provide the most 
similar patterns of results both to each other and to the composite measure. However, it appears 
that the breadth measure is the biggest driver of the benefits of example provision. I provide a 
more detailed analysis of the individual measures below. 
Fluency 
 Fluency is the component measure representing the number of ideas generated by the 
participant. Descriptive statistics for fluency are presented in Table 17, Panel A and the 
ANCOVA and simple effects tests are presented in Table 18. The interaction of familiarity and 
counterfactual mindset is significant (F1, 129 = 3.84; p = 0.026, one-tailed). The simple effects 
follow-up tests indicate a marginally significant positive effect of counterfactual mindset given 
higher familiarity (F1, 129 = 2.66; p = 0.053, one-tailed) and a non-significant negative effect of 
counterfactual mindset given lower familiarity (F1, 129 = 1.33; p = 0.252, two-tailed). These 
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results are consistent with the predictions of H1 indicating that the number of ideas generated is a 
strong driver of the overall idea generation results. For H2 the results are not as strong as those 
for H1. Although both the lower (H2a) and higher (H2b) familiarity conditions display the 
hypothesized pattern of results, the follow up simple effects test are not significant indicating 
that the number of ideas generated is not a strong driver of the overall idea generation results for 
H2. 
Breadth 
 Breadth is the component measure representing the variety of ideas generated by each 
participant. Descriptive statistics for breadth are presented in Table 17, Panel B and the 
ANCOVA and simple effects tests are presented in Table 19. The interaction of familiarity and 
counterfactual mindset is not significant (F1, 129 = 0.86; p = 0.179, one-tailed). These results are 
inconsistent with the predictions of H1 indicating that the breadth of ideas generated is not a 
strong driver of the overall idea generation results.  
 For H2 the results are mixed. When familiarity is lower (H2a), I find a significant planned 
contrast interaction of counterfactual mindset and  (F1, 129 = 59.54; p < 0.001, one-tailed). The 
simple effect follow up tests indicate a significant positive effect of example in the absence of a 
counterfactual mindset (F1, 129 = 3.89; p < 0.026, one-tailed). When familiarity is high (H2b), 
however, the overall pattern shows no benefit of example despite finding a significant planned 
contrast interaction of counterfactual mindset and example (F1, 129 = 9.19; p = 0.003, one-tailed) 
and the simple effects follow up tests are not significant. These results indicate that the breadth 
of ideas generated is a strong driver of the overall idea generation results for H2a (lower 
familiarity) but not for H2b (higher familiarity). 
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Elaboration 
 Elaboration is the component measure representing the level of specification that the 
participant provides regarding the ideas generated. Descriptive statistics for elaboration are 
presented in Table 17, Panel C and the ANCOVA and simple effects tests are presented in Table 
20. The interaction of familiarity and counterfactual mindset is significant (F1, 129 = 6.54; p = 
0.006, one-tailed).30  These results are consistent with the predictions of H1 indicating that the 
specificity of ideas generated is a strong driver of the overall idea generation results.  
 For H2, however the results are mixed. When familiarity is lower (H2a) I find a significant 
planned contrast interaction of counterfactual mindset and  (F1, 129 = 23.34; p < 0.001, one-
tailed), but the simple effect follow up tests are not significant. When familiarity is higher (H2b), 
however, I find a significant planned contrast interaction of counterfactual mindset and example 
(F1, 129 = 27.84; p < 0.001, one-tailed). The simple effects follow up tests indicate a significant 
positive effect of a counterfactual mindset in the absence of an example (F1, 129 = 8.07; p = 0.003, 
one-tailed) and example provision in the absence of a counterfactual mindset (F1, 129 = 4.99; p < 
0.014, one-tailed). These results indicate that the specificity of ideas generated is a strong driver 
of the overall idea generation results for H2b (higher familiarity) but not for H2a (lower 
familiarity). 
Supplemental Analysis Regarding Audit Efficiency 
 One of the primary motivations for this study is that promoting flexible idea generation 
will increase the likelihood of discovering audit process improvements. I find evidence that 
priming a counterfactual mindset and providing an example procedure, both individually or 
                                                            
30 The simple effects follow-up tests indicate a significant positive effect of counterfactual mindset given higher 
familiarity (F1,129 = 6.50; p = 0.006, one-tailed) and a non-significant negative effect of counterfactual mindset 
given lower familiarity (F1,129 = 1.18; p = 0.280, two-tailed). 
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jointly, improve audit efficiency for familiar tasks (ANOVA results not tabulated). Following the 
primary audit evidence idea generation task participants created an audit program from the 
procedures listed and estimated the number of hours that would be required to complete their 
program. Compared to the no counterfactual mindset and no example condition participants 
reported that their audit plans would take significantly fewer hours to complete when they 
received an example (F1, 122 = 3.92; p = 0.050, two-tailed), when they were primed with a 
counterfactual mindset (F1, 122 = 4.16; p = 0.044, two-tailed), and when they both received an 
example and were primed with a counterfactual mindset (F1, 122 = 4.13; p = 0.044, two-tailed). 
These results are robust to controlling for the participants’ judgments of how much assurance 
their programs provided. Therefore, it appears that participants believed that they were able to 
form more efficient audit programs when prompted to engage in flexible idea generation. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 I examine the potential benefits of counterfactual mindset and example provision on 
promoting flexible auditor thinking in audit planning design. Theory indicates that priming a 
counterfactual mindset helps auditors activate a wider range of knowledge when generating audit 
evidence ideas for a familiar auditing context, regardless of example presence. In unfamiliar 
auditing contexts, however, the introduction of a counterfactual mindset negates the benefits of 
example provision. While the majority of auditing literature to date demonstrates how 
counterfactual thinking can be beneficial to auditor judgment, I find that priming a counterfactual 
mindset can have negative effects for unfamiliar audit planning tasks. Overall, my theory and 
findings indicate that when auditors desire increased flexibility in idea generation for the 
redesign of familiar transactions, priming a counterfactual mindset is the more beneficial prompt. 
If auditors desire increased flexibility in idea generation when designing audit procedures for 
unfamiliar transactions the provision of an example is the more beneficial prompt. Finally, in no 
setting did the joint use of both prompts together provide additive benefits to idea generation. 
Practical Implications 
 Although the design of this study purposely abstracts away from a real audit setting in 
order to provide a strong test of theory, I believe that the concepts could be fairly easily 
implemented in practice. In an effort to increase standardization, the major accounting firms 
have invested in technology that guides auditors through the firm’s methodology. This 
technology could also be used to promote flexible idea generation without sacrificing control. 
Audit seniors often take the first pass at setting up a reoccurring engagement. When doing so, the 
technology system could ask, “Are you planning for a new transaction/area or for a 
transaction/area audited in prior year?” If the auditor response it is a recurring transaction then 
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the next question would be one that evokes a counterfactual mindset (e.g., take a moment to list 
anything you believe we should have done differently in prior year). If the auditor responds it is a 
new transaction then they would not receive the counterfactual question and would be directed to 
seek out an example before continuing. In both cases, the system could maintain a database of 
potential evidence to be utilized during formal stages of planning and validated during walk 
through procedures. 
 In practice it may be difficult to determine an individual’s familiarity level with an audit 
area or transaction. For example, recall that in Study 1 I find evidence indicative of auditors with 
greater experience being more likely to misperceive relatively unfamiliar transactions as 
relatively familiar. Future research should examine individual ability to assess familiarity. If, in 
the interim, audit firms wished to enact the recommendations made in this study, they could do 
so by utilizing the counterfactual prompt only for less experienced auditors. The highest risk 
scenarios for an audit firm are those that are unfamiliar to their most experienced auditors. In 
these cases a counterfactual mindset negates the benefits of example provision and thus should 
be avoided. However, it is important to note that prompting a counterfactual mindset is relatively 
risk free since in no condition did any of the auditors perform worse than they did in the absence 
of the manipulated factors (i.e., no counterfactual/example absent condition). Less experienced 
auditors appear to be more aware about what is or is not familiar to them and work in less risky 
areas (i.e., less judgmental and more familiar to the firm as a whole). These areas could benefit 
from a counterfactual mindset, as it is the stronger stimulant of ideas in familiar tasks. Since the 
senior/in-charge auditors typically take the first pass at audit planning and are most involved 
with using audit technology interfaces, the recommended implementation described previously 
could be a viable implementation. 
61 
Limitations 
This study has several limitations that indicate interesting avenues for future research. 
First, the effect of an example on idea generation is somewhat dependent on the example 
selected. The examples used in this study were fairly simple and common audit evidence, which 
biases against finding the predicted results. An example that is less usual is likely to amplify the 
effects I predict, but there is also the possibility that a boundary condition exists at which an 
example that is too unusual will be dismissed as irrelevant by the idea generator. Additionally, as 
a transaction increases in uniqueness, or firm level unfamiliarity, it becomes more difficult to 
obtain an example. One encouraging item to note here that the lack of ability to identify an 
example could become a critical red flag to audit firms that consultation with regulatory agencies 
may be necessary to identify an appropriate audit approach or consider resignation of the client if 
one cannot be identified. Future research should systematically vary features of the example to 
determine the most effective form for promoting flexible idea generation. 
 Second, in my operationalization of counterfactual mindset I use a manipulation that 
prompts a specific form of mental simulation and that I believe biases against finding my 
predicted results. However, the psychology literature has identified various attributes of mental 
simulations that change the effect on individuals’ cognition and their subsequent actions. (1) 
Simulations may be either upward or downward in nature. Upward simulations create a scenario 
that is more desirable than reality while downward simulations create a scenario that is less 
desirable than reality (Wong et al. 2009). (2) Mental simulations may be counterfactual or 
prefactual. A counterfactual simulation involves modifying the facts of what actually happened 
in order to create a new, hypothetical scenario. Alternatively, prefactual simulations are fully 
fictional as they are constructed entirely from the individual’s imagination of what may occur in 
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the future (Van Boven et al. 2009). (3) As individuals build simulations they may add or subtract 
various components in order to test the effects of doing so in their mental laboratory. Whether 
the nature of a mental simulation overall is more additive or subtractive can influence the 
cognitive processing style employed during subsequent activities (Van Boven et al. 2009; Wong 
et al. 2009).31 (4) Finally, the simulation can vary in magnitude, or degree of departure from 
reality. The greater the magnitude, the less believable the simulation, and the less impact it has 
on future cognition and actions (Kahneman and Tversky 1982). My experiment uses an upward, 
additive, counterfactual prompt with a relatively small magnitude. Future research may wish to 
investigate the use of downward, subtractive, prefactual prompts and/or different combinations 
of these attributes with varying magnitudes. 
Third, in designing a strong manipulation of familiarity it was beneficial to change many 
features of the task. Since I was unaware of the specific backgrounds of the auditor participants, 
it was not possible to know what types of tasks they were and were not familiar with a priori. 
Therefore, the design of the lower familiarity task used a case that was almost certainly equally 
unfamiliar to all participants. To the extent that a specific, subtler part of this manipulation drove 
the familiarity results, I am unable to tease this out in my results.  
Finally, I cannot unilaterally recommend the interventions examined here for 
implementation in all audit settings, as other variables may exist in the real world that would 
interact in an undesirable way. Future research should investigate whether constructs such as 
expertise, accountability, information load, information relevance, incentives, and feedback 
interact differently with a counterfactual mindset and example provision than the relationships 
documented in this study. 
                                                            
31 Cognitive processing style refers to the way that an individual accumulates information from their surroundings, 
organizes that information and subsequently uses it to make a decision or judgment (Leonard and Scholl 1999). 
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Despite these limitations, this is the first study I am aware of that explicitly examines 
flexibility of audit procedure design and more specifically investigates ways to enhance that idea 
generation process. Introduction of the counterfactual mindset to the accounting literature 
extends research that employs counterfactual thinking to improve auditor judgments to areas 
where conscious prompts to consider alternatives previously have failed (e.g., Heiman 1990). 
Additionally, I provide evidence of two factors, example provision and familiarity, that moderate 
the effect of counterfactual mindset in idea generation tasks. Example presence and familiarity 
may explain the documented negative effects of counterfactual mindset on creative generation 
tasks in the psychology literature (Kray et al. 2006). The effects of familiarity emphasize the 
need for further research on when the effects of counterfactual thinking research, performed 
largely with student subjects performing trivial tasks, generalize to professional subjects 
performing tasks within their area of expertise. 
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FIGURES 
FIGURE 1 
Search for Ideas in Associative Memory* 
 
Panel A: Familiar Task 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Unfamiliar Task 
 
 
 
*Adapted from Nijstad and Stroebe (2006). 
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FIGURE 2 
Summary of Predicted Effects 
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FIGURE 3 
Graphical Representation of Hypothesis 1 
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FIGURE 4 
Graphical Representation of Hypothesis 2 
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FIGURE 5 
Experimental Procedures 
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FIGURE 6 
Experimental Manipulations 
 
Panel A: Counterfactual Mindset Prime 
Jane is at a rock concert of one of her favorite bands. Seating is on a first come, first served basis. At the 
concert the announcer reveals that a trip to Hawaii will be given to a lucky fan and that the winner will be 
determined by the seat number currently occupied. [Counterfactual condition: Jane’s view of the stage is 
partially obstructed and she sees a much better seat in the near vicinity so she changes seats.] The 
announcer returns just prior to the start of the concert to announce the winner of the trip to Hawaii. To 
Jane’s surprise the announcer calls the number of the seat she just moved to and she wins the trip to 
Hawaii. 
 
Panel B: Lower Familiarity 
The client is a well-known technology company that often asks job applicants very challenging interview 
questions. One of these questions asks the applicants, “How many golf balls would fit inside a school 
bus?” 
 
The legal department of this company is concerned that disgruntled applicants could sue the company if 
they feel their answers are incorrectly dismissed. Therefore, the lawyers of the firm required that the 
company purchase a school bus and fill it with golf balls when they started using this question in 
interviews. Your firm has been engaged to attest as to the number of golf balls currently held inside the 
school bus. 
 
Your task is to create an audit plan for this engagement by identifying audit evidence you could obtain 
and audit procedures that you could perform in order to get assurance over the number of golf balls in the 
school bus. 
 
[Example Present Condition: For example, obtain the dimensions of the school bus and use that 
information in an analytical procedure to estimate the number of golf balls that the bus can hold.] 
 
Panel C: Higher Familiarity 
The client is a well-known construction company that is diversifying its operations. In the past year this 
company purchased a toll bridge that was previously owned and operated by a smaller private company. 
Toll bridge operations are not an area in which this company has experience, so these operations are 
completely new to the current year audit. 
 
Your firm has been engaged to attest to the post acquisition financial statements of this company. More 
specifically, you have been assigned to work on the toll bridge business segment exclusively. 
 
Your task is to create an audit plan for this engagement by identifying audit evidence you could obtain 
and audit procedures that you could perform in order to get assurance over the revenues associated with 
the toll bridge’s operations. 
 
[Example Present Condition: For example, obtain data on average daily traffic flow across the bridge 
and use that information in an analytical procedure to estimate the expected annual revenues.]  
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FIGURE 7 
Example Responses for Lower Familiarity (School Bus) Case 
 
Panel A: Maximum Factor Score (20.8) – Participant #135 
-Idea 1: Get weight of school bus before & after bus is filled with golf balls. Get evidence of type of golf 
balls purchased (receipt, email, correspondence, etc.) and do independent test as to average weight of golf 
balls. Observe weight being measured & that bus was full. Based on these facts. Calculate estimate as to # 
of balls in bus once full. 
-Idea 2: Schedule observation of these procedures & observe as the balls are counted & placed in bus. 
-Idea 3: Get dimensions of bus & evidence of type of balls used. Using box, independently determine how 
many balls fit in box dimensions -> extrapolate to full bus dimensions. 
 
Scoring Summary: Fluency = 10; Breadth = 4; Elaboration = 10; Originality (not part of factor) = 0.1 
 
Panel B: Minimum Factor Score (1.7) – Participant #82 
Perform a cycle count/observation count. 
 
Scoring Summary: Fluency = 1; Breadth = 1; Elaboration = 0; Originality (not part of factor) = 0 
 
Panel C: Maximum Originality (3.8) – Participant #117 
Evidence Items  
-Title to the school bus purchased by the company 
-Receipts (& evidence of payment such as check copy or wire debits) from the store where the golf balls 
were purchased 
-Picture of the school bus filled with golf balls 
-Company's documentation of how many golf balls they were able to fit in the school bus 
Audit Procedures  
-You could reperform the task - use the same school bus & golf balls to see if your count is reasonably 
close to the final determination of the company (+/- 5%) 
-You could observe the company complete the task & keep independent count of the golf balls 
-You could perform analytical procedures: obtain dimensions of school bus & golf ball, then divide to 
determine approx. how many golf ball fit in the bus 
 
Scoring Summary (Non-Originality Measures): Fluency = 10; Breadth = 3; Elaboration = 6 
 
Panel D: Minimum Originality (0.0) – Participant #16 
Evidence:  
-Dimensions of golf balls/bus  
Procedures:  
-Weigh each golf ball to ensure each is the same size 
 
Scoring Summary (Non-Originality Measures): Fluency = 2; Breadth = 2; Elaboration = 3 
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FIGURE 8 
Example Responses for Higher Familiarity (Toll Booth) Case 
 
Panel A: Maximum Factor Score (23.5) – Participant #119 
1. Prior year financial statements (including BS, IS, CF) 
2. Evidence obtained via discussion w/ toll bridge operator, financial manager of toll bridge 
3. Support for controls in place over AR & revenue 
-AR Reconciliation 
-Daily sales review reports (25 samples) 
-Systems support showing automatic journal entry of revenue and AR (1 sample) 
-Systems support showing how revenue is recorded on toll booth (i.e., is each entry recorded or is there a 
batch entry/day) (1 sample) 
-Count of how many cars pass each day vs. revenue recognized (25 samples) 
4. Support for testing of revenue as of YE 
-AR Rec @ December 
-AR subledger 
-5 days prior to YE and 5 days after listing, 5 selections of cars prior to YE - receipt of $, 5 selections of 
cars after YE - receipt of $ 
 
Scoring Summary: Fluency =11; Breadth = 3; Elaboration = 13; Originality (not part of factor) = 2.5 
 
Panel B: Minimum Factor Score (.934) – Participant #15 
1) Identify types of revenues  
2) Walkthrough to identify any risks/considerations of fraud within significant types of revenues  
3) Design an audit program to perform substantive testing over those revenues that properly address the 
risk of material misstatements identified in #2 above  
4) Test substantively 
 
Scoring Summary: Fluency = 1; Breadth = 0; Elaboration = 0; Originality (not part of factor) = 0.0 
 
Panel C: Maximum Originality (8.5) – Participant #40 
-BoD minutes  
-Revenue projections  
-Consultant reports  
-Confirmation with/from vendors 
 
Scoring Summary (Non-Originality Measures): Fluency = 2; Breadth = 1; Elaboration = 0 
 
Panel D: Minimum Originality (0.0) – Participant #22 
-Test of details on cash  
-Analyze somehow traffic flow per hour. Then multiply by price. 
 
Scoring Summary (Non-Originality Measures): Fluency = 1; Breadth = 1; Elaboration = 1 
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FIGURE 9 
Graphical Representation of Results – Idea Generationa 
 
Panel A: Interaction of Counterfactual Mindset and Familiarity (H1) 
 
 
Notes: 
a I measure audit evidence idea generation as a composite measure of the sum of fluency (number of unique ideas), 
breadth (variety of ideas) and elaboration (level of idea specification) of each idea as coded independently by the 
author and a second coder and weighted by factor analysis loadings. 
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FIGURE 10 
Graphical Representation of H2 Results by Familiarity Condition– Idea Generationa 
 
Panel A: Lower Familiarity (H2a) 
 
Panel B: Higher Familiarity (H2b) 
 
 
Notes: 
a I measure audit evidence idea generation as a composite measure of the sum of fluency (number of unique ideas), 
breadth (variety of ideas) and elaboration (level of idea specification) of each idea as coded independently by the 
author and a second coder and weighted by factor analysis loadings. 
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TABLES 
 
TABLE 1 
Interview Participant Demographic Information 
     
 All Seniors Managers Partners 
 n=15 n=5 n=5 n=5 
  
 Mean (Std. Dev.) 
Age 35.7 30.0 31.4 45.8 
 (9.3) (7.0) (2.7) (7.6) 
Years as an Auditor 11.4 3.4 8.4 22.4 
 (9.8) (0.6) (3.2) (9.0) 
  
 Frequency (Percent of n) 
Firm size     
Big 4 12 (80%) 3 (60%) 5 (100%) 4 (80%) 
Midsize Regional   3 (20%) 2 (40%) 0 (    0%) 1 (20%) 
Industry of specialization     
Financial Services   6 (40%) 2 (40%) 1  (20%) 3 (60%) 
Insurance   3 (20%) 2 (40%) 1  (20%) 0 (  0%) 
Real Estate   3 (20%) 0 (  0%) 2  (40%) 1 (20%) 
Manufacturing   2 (13%) 1 (20%) 1  (20%) 0 (  0%) 
Public Sector   1 (  7%) 0 (  0%) 0  (  0%) 1 (20%) 
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TABLE 2 
Interview Examples 
   
 Easy Task Difficult Task 
Senior 1 
 
Confirming investments Auditing allowance for loan losses 
Senior 2 
 
 
Auditing cash Auditing a loss share agreement with 
FDIC 
Senior 3 
 
Testing fixed asset additions Confirming reinsurance receivables 
Senior 4 
 
 
Testing cash reconciliations Auditing insurance loss adjustment 
reserves 
Senior 5 
 
Inventory test counts Reviewing diluted EPS calculation 
Manager 1 
 
 
Testing income journal activity 
(validating third party work) 
Auditing securities lending transactions 
Manager 2 
 
Testing fixed asset additions Inventory price testing 
Manager 3 
 
Auditing cash Goodwill impairment testing 
Manager 4 
 
 
Reviewing discontinued operations 
disclosure presentation 
Lease contract impairment testing 
Manager 5 
 
 
Auditing revolving line of credit Auditing litigation reserves related to 
natural disaster 
Partner 1 
 
 
Testing information technology 
controls 
Testing information technology access 
for nonstandard process 
Partner 2 
 
 
Reviewing Pro-forma disclosures for 
IPO 
Reviewing purchase price allocations 
for IPO 
Partner 3 
 
Vouching capital activity Valuation of Level 3 securities 
Partner 4 
 
 
Testing mortgage servicing rights 
(validating third party work) 
Auditing allowance for loan losses 
Partner 5 Confirming cash Evaluating accounting treatment of 
contribution to joint venture 
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TABLE 3 
Factor Analysis of Survey Responses 
   
Panel A: Factor Analysis for  Difficult Scenarios – Quartimax Rotation 
   
  Factor 
# Question 1 2 3 4 
      
Task-Internal Factor 
4 How much professional judgment was required to 
execute the audit program procedures surrounding 
this transaction? 
0.98    
1 How routine was the transaction for the client 
being audited? 
0.92    
5 On average, how subjective or objective was the 
evidence you were reviewing? 
0.67    
6 For any evidence prepared by other members of 
your firm, on average what was their level of 
expertise for this type of transaction? 
0.67    
      
Environmental Factor 
9 To what extent did management express a 
preferred accounting treatment that either agreed 
or disagreed with the initial position of your firm? 
 0.87   
10 How similar was the final working paper to the 
prior year’s working paper? 
 0.75   
11 What was the status of the engagement’s budget 
at the time this issue was reviewed? 
 0.75   
      
Task-External Factor 
3 To what degree was the applicable accounting 
guidance unambiguous in that it clearly indicated 
one correct accounting treatment as opposed to 
allowing multiple possible correct methods of 
accounting? 
  0.98  
      
Person Factor 
2 How much personal experience did you have with 
auditing transactions like this? 
   0.96 
      
 Eigenvalue 2.99 2.31 1.29 1.00 
 Percentage variance explained 30.77% 25.64% 15.33% 12.60% 
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TABLE 3 (cont.) 
Factor Analysis of Survey Responses 
     
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics Regarding Task-Internal Factor - Mean (Std. Dev.) [n] 
     
 Rank 
 Senior Manager Partner 
Difficulty Q1 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q1 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q1 Q4 Q5 Q6 
Easy 0.3 3.6 0.6 1.5 1.4 2.1 1.4 4.4 4.1 4.6 3.0 4.6 
 (0.6) (0.8) (0.5) (0.8) (0.6) (0.8) (0.5) (0.8) (0.6) (0.8) (0.5) (0.8) 
 [5] [5] [5] [5] [5] [5] [5] [5] [5] [5] [5] [5] 
             
Difficult 5.9 7.9 3.7 5.6 7.8 8.4 5.8 6.5 4.5 8.4 5.3 7.0 
 (2.0) (0.4) (1.6) (1.2) (2.0) (0.4) (1.6) (1.2) (2.0) (0.4) (1.6) (1.2) 
 [5] [5] [5] [5] [5] [5] [5] [5] [5] [5] [5] [5] 
 
Panel C: Analysis of Variance Regarding Task-Internal Factor 
      
Source (between subjects) SS df MS F-Statistic p-value 
Order 11.55 1 11.55 1.51 0.251 
Rank 48.80 2 24.40 3.18 0.090 
Order*Rank 34.38 2 17.19 2.24 0.162 
Error 69.04 9 7.67   
      
Source (within subjects) SS df MS F-Statistic p-value 
Question 104.90 3 34.97 8.65 < 0.001 
Question*Order 6.51 3 2.17 0.54 0.661 
Question*Rank 19.46 6 3.24 0.80 0.577 
Question*Order*Rank 49.17 6 8.20 2.03 0.097 
Error 109.17 27 4.04   
      
Source (within subjects) SS df MS F-Statistic p-value 
Difficulty 409.81 1 409.81 23.06 0.001 
Difficulty*Order 0.12 1 0.12 0.01 0.936 
Difficulty*Rank 35.08 2 17.54 0.99 0.410 
Difficulty*Order*Rank 36.51 2 18.26 1.03 0.396 
Error 159.92 9 17.77   
      
Source (within subjects) SS df MS F-Statistic p-value 
Question*Difficulty 17.04 3 5.68 1.71 0.189 
Question*Difficulty*Order 14.83 3 4.94 1.49 0.240 
Question*Difficulty*Rank 34.35 6 5.73 1.72 0.154 
Question*Difficulty*Order*Rank 12.70 6 2.12 0.64 0.700 
Error 89.70 27 3.32   
      
Notes: All p-values are two-tailed. 
Dependent: Routineness [Q1], Professional Judgment [Q4], Evidence Subjectivity [Q5], 
Expertise [Q6]; Factors: Order, Rank, Difficulty 
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TABLE 3 (cont.) 
Factor Analysis of Survey Responses 
     
Panel D: Descriptive Statistics Regarding Environmental Factor - Mean (Std. Dev.) [n] 
     
 Rank 
 Senior Manager Partner 
Difficulty Q9 Q10 Q11 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q9 Q10 Q11 
Easy 3.6 2.3 5.0 3.5 3.0 5.0 3.8 1.0 5.0 
 (1.5) (1.4) (0.1) (1.9) (1.7) (0.1) (2.0) (1.8) (0.1) 
 [5] [5] [5] [4] [4] [4] [3] [3] [3] 
          
Difficult 5.2 5.3 5.8 4.7 5.0 5.0 8.3 6.0 7.8 
 (0.7) (1.2) (0.5) (0.9) (1.5) (0.6) (1.0) (1.6) (0.7) 
 [5] [5] [5] [4] [4] [4] [3] [3] [3] 
 
Panel E: Analysis of Variance Regarding Environmental Factor 
      
Source (between subjects) SS df MS F-Statistic p-value 
Order 0.11 1 0.11 0.02 0.907 
Rank 8.78 2 4.39 0.59 0.585 
Order*Rank 2.17 2 1.08 0.15 0.868 
Error 44.81 6 7.47   
      
Source (within subjects) SS df MS F-Statistic p-value 
Question 31.59 2 15.79 3.72 0.055 
Question*Order 2.06 2 1.03 0.24 0.788 
Question*Rank 10.31 4 2.58 0.61 0.665 
Question*Order*Rank 20.19 4 5.05 0.36 0.364 
Error 50.89 12 4.24   
      
Source (within subjects) SS df MS F-Statistic p-value 
Difficulty 77.78 1 77.78 12.04 0.013 
Difficulty*Order 0.54 1 0.54 0.08 0.783 
Difficulty*Rank 21.22 2 10.61 1.64 0.270 
Difficulty*Order*Rank 29.49 2 14.74 2.28 0.183 
Error 38.76 6 6.46   
      
Source (within subjects) SS df MS F-Statistic p-value 
Question*Difficulty 11.57 2 5.78 1.56 0.251 
Question*Difficulty*Order 1.80 2 0.90 0.24 0.788 
Question*Difficulty*Rank 0.57 4 0.14 0.04 0.997 
Question*Difficulty*Order*Rank 16.90 4 4.23 1.14 0.386 
Error 44.63 12 3.72   
      
Notes: All p-values are two-tailed. 
Dependent: Preference [Q9], Similarity [Q10], Budget Status [Q11]; Factors: Order, Rank, 
Difficulty) 
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TABLE 4 
Survey Question: How much professional judgment was required to execute the audit 
program procedures surrounding this transaction? 
(Dependent: Professional Judgment; Factors: Order, Rank, Difficulty) 
     
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics - Mean (Std. Dev.) 
     
 Rank  
Difficulty Senior Manager Partner Total 
Easy 3.6 2.1 4.6 3.5 
 (0.8) (0.8) (0.8)  
 n=5 n=5 n=5 n=15 
     
Difficult 7.9 8.4 8.4 8.2 
 (0.4) (0.4) (0.4)  
 n=5 n=5 n=5 n=15 
 
Panel B: Analysis of Variance      
      
Source (between subjects) SS df MS F-Statistic p-value 
Order 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 0.989 
Rank 7.11 2 3.56 3.11 0.094 
Order*Rank 15.73 2 7.86 6.87 0.015 
Error 10.30 9 1.15   
      
Source (within subjects) SS df MS F-Statistic p-value 
Difficulty 167.81 1 167.81 64.74 0.000 
Difficulty*Order 0.03 1 0.03 0.01 0.921 
Difficulty*Rank 7.89 2 3.94 1.52 0.270 
Difficulty*Order*Rank 16.64 2 8.32 3.21 0.089 
Error 23.33 9 2.59   
      
Note: All p-values are two-tailed.     
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TABLE 5 
Survey Question: How routine was this transaction for the client being audited? 
(Dependent: Routineness; Factors: Order, Rank, Difficulty) 
     
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics - Mean (Std. Dev.) 
    
 Rank  
Difficulty Senior Manager Partner Total 
Easy 0.3 1.4 4.1 1.8 
 (0.6) (0.6) (0.6)  
 n=5 n=5 n=5 n=15 
     
Difficult 5.9 7.8 4.5 5.9 
 (2.0) (2.0) (2.0)  
 n=5 n=5 n=5 n=15 
 
Panel B: Analysis of Variance      
      
Source (between subjects) SS df MS F-Statistic p-value 
Order 6.73 1 6.73 0.70 0.425 
Rank 12.05 2 6.02 0.63 0.556 
Order*Rank 23.24 2 11.62 1.21 0.343 
Error 86.55 9 9.61   
      
Source (within subjects) SS df MS F-Statistic p-value 
Difficulty 124.00 1 124.00 11.56 0.008 
Difficulty*Order 9.89 1 9.89 0.92 0.362 
Difficulty*Rank 50.74 2 25.37 2.37 0.149 
Difficulty*Order*Rank 17.89 2 8.94 8.94 0.465 
Error 96.54 9 10.73 10.73  
      
Note: All p-values are two-tailed.     
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TABLE 6 
Survey Question: On average, how subjective or objective was the evidence that you were 
reviewing? 
(Dependent: Evidence Subjectivity; Factors: Order, Rank, Difficulty) 
     
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics - Mean (Std. Dev.) 
     
 Rank  
Difficulty Senior Manager Partner Total 
Easy 0.6 1.4 3.0 1.6 
 (0.5) (0.5) (0.5)  
 n=5 n=5 n=5 n=15 
     
Difficult 3.7 5.8 5.3 4.8 
 (1.6) (1.6) (1.6)  
 n=5 n=5 n=5 n=15 
 
Panel B: Analysis of Variance      
      
Source (between subjects) SS df MS F-Statistic p-value 
Order 1.01 1 1.01 0.18 0.684 
Rank 21.49 2 10.75 1.88 0.208 
Order*Rank 5.49 2 2.74 0.48 0.634 
Error 51.54 9 5.73   
      
Source (within subjects) SS df MS F-Statistic p-value 
Difficulty 76.44 1 76.44 9.34 0.014 
Difficulty*Order 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 0.990 
Difficulty*Rank 5.28 2 0.32 0.32 0.732 
Difficulty*Order*Rank 9.24 2 0.57 0.57 0.587 
Error  9    
      
Note: All p-values are two-tailed.     
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TABLE 7 
Survey Question: For any evidence prepared by other members of your firm, on average 
what was their level of expertise for this type of transaction? 
(Dependent: Expertise; Factors: Order, Rank, Difficulty) 
     
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics - Mean (Std. Dev.) 
     
 Rank  
Difficulty Senior Manager Partner Total 
Easy 1.5 4.4 4.6 3.5 
 (0.8) (0.8) (0.8)  
 n=5 n=5 n=5 n=15 
     
Difficult 5.6 6.5 7.0 6.5 
 (1.2) (1.2) (1.2)  
 n=5 n=5 n=5 n=15 
 
Panel B: Analysis of Variance      
      
Source (between subjects) SS df MS F-Statistic p-value 
Order 10.32 1 10.32 3.11 0.111 
Rank 27.61 2 13.80 4.17 0.052 
Order*Rank 39.10 2 19.55 5.90 0.023 
Error 29.82 9 3.31   
      
Source (within subjects) SS df MS F-Statistic p-value 
Difficulty 58.60 1 58.60 9.40 0.013 
Difficulty*Order 5.03 1 5.03 0.81 0.392 
Difficulty*Rank 5.53 2 2.77 0.44 0.655 
Difficulty*Order*Rank 5.44 2 2.72 0.44 0.659 
Error 56.12 9 6.24   
      
Note: All p-values are two-tailed.     
      
 
  
90 
TABLE 8 
Survey Question: To what degree was the applicable accounting guidance unambiguous in 
that it clearly indicated one correct accounting treatment as opposed to allowing multiple 
possibly correct methods of accounting? 
(Dependent: Guidance Ambiguity; Factors: Order, Rank, Difficulty) 
     
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics - Mean (Std. Dev.) 
     
 Rank  
Difficulty Senior Manager Partner Total 
Easy 2.4 1.2 3.5 2.5 
 (1.1) (1.1) (1.1)  
 n=5 n=5 n=5 n=15 
     
Difficult 3.5 5.4 6.4 5.4 
 (1.0) (1.0) (1.0)  
 n=5 n=5 n=5 n=15 
 
Panel B: Analysis of Variance      
      
Source (between subjects) SS df MS F-Statistic p-value 
Order 1.70 1 1.70 0.46 0.514 
Rank 22.35 2 11.18 3.03 0.099 
Order*Rank 40.63 2 20.32 5.50 0.028 
Error 33.24 9 3.69   
      
Source (within subjects) SS df MS F-Statistic p-value 
Difficulty 54.12 1 54.12 7.52 0.023 
Difficulty*Order 0.24 1 0.24 0.03 0.861 
Difficulty*Rank 11.63 2 5.82 0.81 0.475 
Difficulty*Order*Rank 9.77 2 4.88 0.68 0.531 
Error 64.74 9 7.19   
      
Note: All p-values are two-tailed.     
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TABLE 9 
Survey Question: To what extent did management express a preferred accounting 
treatment that either agreed or disagreed with the initial position of your firm? 
(Dependent: Preference; Factors: Order, Rank, Difficulty) 
     
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics - Mean (Std. Dev.) 
     
 Rank  
Difficulty Senior Manager Partner Total 
Easy 3.6 3.5 3.8 3.5 
 (1.4) (1.8) (1.5)  
 n=5 n=4 n=4 n=13 
     
Difficult 5.2 4.7 7.8 5.6 
 (0.7) (0.9) (0.8)  
 n=5 n=4 n=4 n=13 
 
Panel B: Analysis of Variance      
      
Source (between subjects) SS df MS F-Statistic p-value 
Order 1.58 1 1.58 0.26 0.623 
Rank 12.01 2 6.01 1.00 0.415 
Order*Rank 6.25 2 3.12 0.52 0.615 
Error 41.99 7 6.00   
      
Source (within subjects) SS df MS F-Statistic p-value 
Difficulty 28.78 1 28.78 5.00 0.061 
Difficulty*Order 0.74 1 0.74 0.13 0.730 
Difficulty*Rank 8.94 2 4.47 0.78 0.496 
Difficulty*Order*Rank 39.18 2 19.59 3.40 0.093 
Error 40.33 7 5.76   
      
Note: All p-values are two-tailed.     
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TABLE 10 
Survey Question: How similar was the final working paper to the prior year’s working 
paper? 
(Dependent: Similarity; Factors: Order, Rank, Difficulty) 
     
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics - Mean (Std. Dev.) 
     
 Rank  
Difficulty Senior Manager Partner Total 
Easy 2.3 3.0 1.5 2.7 
 (1.2) (1.2) (1.6)  
 n=5 n=5 n=4 n=14 
     
Difficult 5.3 6.5 5.8 5.9 
 (1.2) (1.2) (1.5)  
 n=5 n=5 n=4 n=14 
 
Panel B: Analysis of Variance      
      
Source (between subjects) SS df MS F-Statistic p-value 
Order 0.17 1 0.17 0.02 0.886 
Rank 5.87 2 2.93 0.38 0.694 
Order*Rank 9.32 2 4.66 0.61 0.568 
Error 61.41 8 7.68   
      
Source (within subjects) SS df MS F-Statistic p-value 
Difficulty 77.76 1 77.76 11.35 0.010 
Difficulty*Order 0.02 1 0.02 0.00 0.960 
Difficulty*Rank 1.60 2 0.80 0.12 0.891 
Difficulty*Order*Rank 36.88 2 18.44 2.69 0.128 
Error 54.81 8 6.85   
      
Note: All p-values are two-tailed.     
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TABLE 11 
Survey Question: What was the status of the engagement’s budget at the time when this 
issue was reviewed? 
(Dependent: Budget Status; Factors: Order, Rank, Difficulty) 
     
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics - Mean (Std. Dev.) 
     
 Rank  
Difficulty Senior Manager Partner Total 
Easy 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
 (< 0.0) (< 0.0) (< 0.0)  
 n=5 n=5 n=5 n=15 
     
Difficult 5.8 5.7 7.6 6.4 
 (0.5) (0.5) (0.5)  
 n=5 n=5 n=5 n=15 
 
Panel B: Analysis of Variance      
      
Source (between subjects) SS df MS F-Statistic p-value 
Order 2.54 1 2.54 3.67 0.088 
Rank 5.83 2 2.92 4.21 0.051 
Order*Rank 0.31 2 0.16 0.23 0.802 
Error 6.23 9 0.69   
      
Source (within subjects) SS df MS F-Statistic p-value 
Difficulty 13.67 1 13.67 21.42 0.001 
Difficulty*Order 2.13 1 2.13 3.34 0.101 
Difficulty*Rank 5.69 2 2.84 4.46 0.045 
Difficulty*Order*Rank 0.43 2 0.21 0.34 0.723 
Error 5.74 9 0.64   
      
Note: All p-values are two-tailed.     
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TABLE 12 
Survey Question: How much personal experience did you have with auditing transactions 
like this? 
(Dependent: Experience; Factors: Order, Rank, Difficulty) 
     
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics - Mean (Std. Dev.) 
     
 Rank  
Difficulty Senior Manager Partner Total 
Easy 9.0 8.7 8.8 8.7 
 (0.7) (0.7) (0.7)  
 n=5 n=5 n=5 n=15 
     
Difficult 4.5 5.1 7.8 5.9 
 (1.5) (1.5) (1.5)  
 n=5 n=5 n=5 n=15 
 
Panel B: Analysis of Variance      
      
Source (between subjects) SS df MS F-Statistic p-value 
Order 0.05 1 0.05 0.01 0.940 
Rank 14.42 2 7.21 0.87 0.450 
Order*Rank 1.55 2 0.77 0.09 0.911 
Error 74.19 9 8.24   
      
Source (within subjects) SS df MS F-Statistic p-value 
Difficulty 64.80 1 64.80 12.76 0.006 
Difficulty*Order 1.42 1 1.42 0.28 0.609 
Difficulty*Rank 16.00 2 8.00 1.58 0.259 
Difficulty*Order*Rank 14.58 2 7.29 1.44 0.288 
Error 45.70 9 5.08   
      
Note: All p-values are two-tailed.     
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TABLE 13 
Idea Generation Descriptive Statisticsa 
        
Audit Evidence Idea Generation (Standard Error) by Task Condition 
         
  Lower Familiarity   
  Counterfactual Mindset   
Example  No Counterfactual  Counterfactual  Combined   
Absent  10.60  10.11  10.35   
  (1.08)  (1.11)  (0.77)   
             n=18   n=17     n=35              
         
Present  12.59  10.44  11.51   
  (1.12)  (1.11)  (0.79)   
            n=17             n=17  n=34              
         
Combined  11.59  10.27     
  (0.78)  (0.78)     
     n=35  n=34     
         
  Higher Familiarity   
  Counterfactual Mindset   
Example  No Counterfactual  Counterfactual  Combined   
Absent  8.50  11.46  9.98   
  (1.08)  (1.11)  (0.77)   
             n=18   n=17     n=35   
         
Present  10.17  11.97  11.07   
  (1.11)  (1.11)  (0.79)   
             n=17             n=17  n=34              
         
Combined  9.34  11.71     
  (0.78)  (0.78)     
     n=35  n=34     
 
Notes: 
a I measure audit evidence idea generation as a composite measure of the sum of fluency (number of unique 
ideas), breadth (variety of ideas) and elaboration (level of idea specification) of each idea as coded independently 
by the author and a second coder and weighted by factor analysis loadings. 
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TABLE 14 
Inferential Statistics Regarding Overall Audit Evidence Idea Generationa 
(Dependent: Audit Evidence Idea Generation; Factors: Example, Counterfactual Mindset, Task;  
Covariate: Time) 
      
Panel A: Analysis of Covariance 
      
Source (between subjects) SS df MS F-Statistic p-value 
Taskb 5.67 1 5.67 0.27 0.603 
Counterfactual Mindsetc 9.63 1 9.63 0.46 0.498 
Exampled 43.82 1 43.82 2.10 0.150 
Task by Counterfactual Mindset (H1) 115.99 1 115.99 5.56 0.010 
Task by Example 0.04 1 0.04 < 0.01 0.965 
Counterfactual Mindset by Example 17.08 1 17.08 0.82 0.367 
Task by Counterfactual Mindset by Example 0.56 1 0.56 0.03 0.870 
Timee 526.92 1 526.92 25.24 < 0.001 
Error 2,692.88 129 20.88   
      
Panel B: Follow-up Simple Effects for H1      
      
Simple Main Effects of Counterfactual by Task SS df MS F-Statistic p-value 
Audit evidence idea generation is greater for 
counterfactual versus no counterfactual given higher 
familiarity 
97.30 1 97.30 4.66 0.017 
      
Audit evidence idea generation is greater for 
counterfactual versus no counterfactual given lower 
familiarity 
29.53 1 29.53 1.42 0.236 
      
Panel C: Planned Contrast Interaction of Counterfactual and Example  
      
Lower Familiarity SS df MS F-Statistic p-value 
H2a: When familiarity is lower the provision of an 
example will result in the greatest idea generation (+3) 
versus providing no intervention (-1), a counterfactual 
mindset prompt in isolation (-1), or both prompts 
together (-1). 
1,063.75 1 1,063.75 50.96 < 0.001 
      
Higher Familiarity  SS df MS F-Statistic p-value 
H2b: When familiarity is higher the provision of an 
example (-1) will result in greater idea generation 
versus providing no intervention (-3) and prompting a 
counterfactual mindset will result in the greatest idea 
generation regardless of example presence (+2) or 
absence (+2). 
460.96 1 460.96 22.08 < 0.001 
      
Notes: 
Reported p-values are two-tailed unless testing a one-tailed prediction, as signified in bold face. 
a I measure audit evidence idea generation as a composite measure of the sum of fluency (number of unique ideas), 
breadth (variety of ideas) and elaboration (level of idea specification) of each idea as coded independently by the 
author and a second coder and weighted by factor analysis loadings. 
b Task = case contained lower familiarity (school bus) versus higher familiarity (toll booth), manipulated between 
subjects 
c Counterfactual Mindset = counterfactual mindset prime versus no counterfactual mindset prime, manipulated 
between subjects 
d Example = example audit evidence was present verses absent, manipulated between subjects 
e Time = amount of time in minutes that the participant used to complete the experiment in its entirety 
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TABLE 15 
Originality Descriptive Statisticsa 
        
Originality (Standard Error) by Task Condition 
         
  Lower Familiarity   
  Counterfactual Mindset   
Example  No Counterfactual  Counterfactual  Combined   
Absent  1.41  1.36  1.38   
  (0.40)  (0.40)  (0.28)   
             n=18   n=17     n=35              
         
Present  1.09  1.27  1.18   
  (0.40)  (0.40)  (0.28)   
            n=17             n=17  n=34              
         
Combined  1.25  1.31     
  (0.28)  (0.28)     
     n=35  n=34     
         
  Higher Familiarity   
  Counterfactual Mindset   
Example  No Counterfactual  Counterfactual  Combined   
Absent  2.53  2.19  2.36   
  (0.39)  (0.40)  (0.28)   
             n=18   n=17     n=35   
         
Present  2.21  1.58  1.89   
  (0.40)  (0.40)  (0.28)   
             n=17             n=17  n=34              
         
Combined  2.37  1.89     
  (0.28)  (0.28)     
     n=35  n=34     
 
Notes: 
a I measure the originality, or the novelty of proposed audit evidence items generated, as the sum of the number 
of points awarded to each response for rarity in comparison to the entire pool of participant responses divided by 
the total number of ideas (fluency). 
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TABLE 16 
Inferential Statistics Regarding Audit Evidence Originalitya 
(Dependent: Originality; Factors: Example, Counterfactual Mindset, Task;  
Covariate: Time) 
      
Panel A: Analysis of Covariance 
      
Source (between subjects) SS df MS F-Statistic p-value 
Taskb 24.47 1 24.47 9.17 0.003 
Counterfactual Mindsetc 1.45 1 1.45 0.54 0.463 
Exampled 3.87 1 3.87 1.45 0.231 
Task by Counterfactual Mindset (H1) 2.54 1 2.54 0.95 0.331 
Task by Example 0.58 1 0.58 0.22 0.642 
Counterfactual Mindset by Example 0.01 1 0.01 < 0.01 0.956 
Task by Counterfactual Mindset by Example 0.59 1 0.59 0.22 0.640 
Time 3.00 1 3.00 1.12 0.291 
Error 344.36 129 2.67   
      
Panel B: Follow-up Simple Effects for H1      
      
Simple Main Effects of Counterfactual by Task SS df MS F-Statistic p-value 
Originality is greater for counterfactual versus no 
counterfactual given higher familiarity 3.95 1 3.95 1.48 0.226 
      
Originality is greater for counterfactual versus no 
counterfactual given lower familiarity 0.08 1 0.08 0.03 0.863 
      
Panel C: Planned Contrast Interaction of Counterfactual and Example  
      
Lower Familiarity SS df MS F-Statistic p-value 
H2a: When familiarity is lower the provision of an 
example will result in the greatest originality (+3) 
versus providing no intervention (-1), a counterfactual 
mindset prompt in isolation (-1), or both prompts 
together (-1). 
9.31 1 9.31 3.49 0.064 
      
Higher Familiarity  SS df MS F-Statistic p-value 
H2b: When familiarity is higher the provision of an 
example (-1) will result in greater originality versus 
providing no intervention (-3) and prompting a 
counterfactual mindset will result in the greatest 
originality regardless of example presence (+2) or 
absence (+2). 
0.27 1 0.27 0.10 0.749 
      
Notes: 
Reported p-values are two-tailed unless testing a one-tailed prediction, as signified in bold face. 
a I measure the originality, or the novelty of proposed audit evidence items generated, as the sum of the number of 
points awarded to each response for rarity in comparison to the entire pool of participant responses divided by the 
total number of ideas (fluency). 
b Task = case contained lower familiarity (school bus) versus higher familiarity (toll booth), manipulated between 
subjects 
c Counterfactual Mindset = counterfactual mindset prime versus no counterfactual mindset prime, manipulated 
between subjects 
d Example = example audit evidence was present verses absent, manipulated between subjects 
e Time = amount of time in minutes that the participant used to complete the experiment in its entirety 
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TABLE 17 
Supplemental Descriptive Statistics of Idea Generation Component Measures 
        
Panel A: Fluency of Proposed Audit Evidence (Standard Error)a 
         
  Lower Familiarity  Higher Familiarity 
  Counterfactual Mindset  Counterfactual Mindset 
Example  No Counterfactual  Counterfactual  No Counterfactual  Counterfactual 
Absent  5.0  4.8  4.8  5.6 
  (0.5)  (0.6)  (0.5)  (0.6) 
             n=18    n=17  n=18  n=17 
         
Present  5.8  4.8  4.8  5.8 
  (0.6)  (0.6)  (0.6)  (0.6) 
            n=17             n=17  n=17  n=17 
 
Panel B: Breadth of Proposed Audit Evidence (Standard Error)b 
         
  Lower Familiarity  Higher Familiarity 
  Counterfactual Mindset  Counterfactual Mindset 
Example  No Counterfactual  Counterfactual  No Counterfactual  Counterfactual 
Absent  2.8  2.8  2.3  2.3 
  (0.3)  (0.3)  (0.3)  (0.3) 
             n=18    n=17  n=18  n=17 
         
Present  3.5  3.1  2.2  2.6 
  (0.3)  (0.3)  (0.3)  (0.3) 
            n=17             n=17  n=17  n=17 
 
Panel C: Elaboration of Proposed Audit Evidence (Standard Error)c 
         
  Lower Familiarity  Higher Familiarity 
  Counterfactual Mindset  Counterfactual Mindset 
Example  No Counterfactual  Counterfactual  No Counterfactual  Counterfactual 
Absent  4.6  4.2  2.8  5.3 
  (0.6)  (0.7)  (0.6)  (0.7) 
             n=18  n=17            n=18             n=17 
         
Present  5.4  4.3  4.8  5.5 
  (0.6)  (0.7)  (0.7)  (0.7) 
             n=17             n=17            n=17             n=17 
      
Notes: 
a I measure the fluency, or the quantity of audit evidence ideas generated, as the sum of the number of evidence 
items generated as independently coded by the author and a second coder. 
b I measure the breadth, or the variety of proposed audit evidence items generated, as the sum of the number of 
categories spanned by the proposed audit evidence items as independently coded by the author and a second coder. 
c I measure the elaboration, or the degree of specification of the audit evidence ideas generated, as the sum of the 
number of points awarded as independently coded by the author and a second coder. 
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TABLE 18 
Inferential Statistics Regarding Fluency of Idea Generationa 
(Dependent: Fluency of Proposed Audit Evidence; Factors: Example, Counterfactual Mindset, Task;  
Covariate: Time) 
      
Panel A: Analysis of Covariance 
      
Source (between subjects) SS df MS F-Statistic p-value 
Taskb 0.79 1 0.79 0.15 0.701 
Counterfactual Mindsetc 0.59 1 0.59 0.11 0.739 
Exampled 2.66 1 2.66 0.50 0.481 
Task by Counterfactual Mindset 20.43 1 20.43 3.84 0.026 
Task by Example 0.76 1 0.76 0.14 0.705 
Counterfactual Mindset by Example 0.91 1 0.91 0.17 0.679 
Task by Counterfactual Mindset by Example 2.40 1 2.40 0.45 0.502 
Time 137.69 1 137.69 25.90 <0.001 
Error 685.90 129 5.32   
      
Panel B: Simple Effects Analogous to H1      
      
Simple Main Effects of Counterfactual by Task SS df MS F-Statistic p-value 
Fluency of idea generation is greater for counterfactual 
versus no counterfactual given higher familiarity 14.16 1 14.16 2.66 0.053 
      
Fluency of idea generation is greater for 
counterfactual versus no counterfactual given lower 
familiarity 
7.05 1 7.05 1.33 0.252 
      
Panel C: Planned Contrast Interaction of Counterfactual and Example (Analogous to H2)  
      
Lower Familiarity SS df MS F-Statistic p-value 
When familiarity is lower the provision of an example 
will result in the greatest fluency of idea generation 
(+3) versus providing no intervention (-1), a 
counterfactual mindset prompt in isolation (-1), or 
both prompts together (-1). 
238.91 1 238.91 44.93 <0.001 
      
Higher Familiarity SS df MS F-Statistic p-value 
When familiarity is higher the provision of an example 
(-1) will result in greater fluency of idea generation 
versus providing no intervention (-3) and prompting a 
counterfactual mindset will result in the greatest 
originality regardless of example presence (+2) or 
absence (+2). 
74.57 1 74.57 14.02 <0.001 
      
Notes: 
Reported p-values are two-tailed unless testing a one-tailed prediction, as signified in bold face. 
a I measure the fluency, or the quantity of audit evidence ideas generated, as the sum of the number of evidence 
items generated as independently coded by the author and a second coder. 
b Task = task contained lower familiarity (school bus) versus higher familiarity (toll booth), manipulated between 
subjects 
c Counterfactual Mindset = counterfactual mindset prime versus no counterfactual mindset prime, manipulated 
between subjects 
d Example = example audit evidence was present verses absent, manipulated between subjects 
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TABLE 19 
Inferential Statistics Regarding Breadth of Proposed Audit Evidencea 
(Dependent: Breadth of Proposed Audit Evidence; Factors: Example, Counterfactual Mindset, Task; Covariate: 
Time) 
      
Panel A: Analysis of Covariance 
      
Source (between subjects) SS df MS F-Statistic p-value 
Taskb 16.15 1 16.15 14.00 <0.001 
Counterfactual Mindsetc <0.01 1 <0.01 <0.01 0.953 
Exampled  2.91 1 2.91 2.52 0.115 
Task by Counterfactual Mindset 0.99 1 0.99 0.86 0.179 
Task by Example 1.66 1 1.66 1.44 0.232 
Counterfactual Mindset by Example 0.02 1 0.02 0.01 0.906 
Task by Counterfactual Mindset by Example 1.18 1 1.18 1.02 0.314 
Time 3.95 1 3.95 3.42 0.067 
Error 148.72 129 1.15   
      
Panel B: Simple Effects Analogous to H1      
      
Simple Main Effects of Counterfactual by Task SS df MS F-Statistic p-value 
Breadth of proposed audit evidence is greater for 
counterfactual versus no counterfactual given higher 
familiarity 
0.57 1 0.57 0.49 0.243 
      
Breadth of proposed audit evidence is greater for 
counterfactual versus no counterfactual given lower 
familiarity 
0.43 1 0.43 0.38 0.542 
      
Panel C: Planned Contrast Interaction of Counterfactual and Example (Analogous to H2)  
      
Lower Familiarity SS df MS F-Statistic p-value 
When familiarity is lower the provision of an example 
will result in the greatest breadth (+3) versus 
providing no intervention (-1), a counterfactual 
mindset prompt in isolation (-1), or both prompts 
together (-1). 
68.64 1 68.64 59.54 <0.001 
      
Higher Familiarity SS df MS F-Statistic p-value 
When familiarity is higher the provision of an 
example (-1) will result in greater breadth versus 
providing no intervention (-3) and prompting a 
counterfactual mindset will result in the greatest 
originality regardless of example presence (+2) or 
absence (+2). 
10.60 1 10.60 9.19 0.002 
      
Notes: 
Reported p-values are two-tailed unless testing a one-tailed prediction, as signified in bold face. 
a I measure the breadth, or variety of proposed audit evidence items generated, as the sum of the number of 
categories spanned by the proposed audit evidence items as independently coded by the author and a second coder. 
b Task = task contained lower familiarity (school bus) versus higher familiarity (toll booth), manipulated between 
subjects 
c Counterfactual Mindset = counterfactual mindset prime versus no counterfactual mindset prime, manipulated 
between subjects 
d Example = example audit evidence was present verses absent, manipulated between subjects 
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TABLE 20 
Inferential Statistics Regarding Elaboration of Idea Generationa 
(Dependent: Elaboration of Proposed Audit Evidence; Factors: Example, Counterfactual Mindset, Task; 
Covariate: Time) 
      
Panel A: Analysis of Covariance 
      
Source (between subjects) SS df MS F-Statistic p-value 
Taskb 0.06 1 0.06 0.01 0.928 
Counterfactual Mindsetc 7.65 1 7.65 1.06 0.305 
Exampled 20.46 1 20.46 2.83 0.095 
Task by Counterfactual Mindset 47.20 1 47.20 6.54 0.006 
Task by Example 3.49 1 3.49 0.48 0.488 
Counterfactual Mindset by Example 13.86 1 13.86 1.92 0.168 
Task by Counterfactual Mindset by Example 3.20 1 3.20 0.44 0.507 
Time 154.68 1 154.68 21.42 <0.001 
Error 931.49 129 7.22   
      
Panel B: Simple Effects Analogous to H1      
      
Simple Main Effects of Counterfactual by Task SS df MS F-Statistic p-value 
Elaboration of idea generation is greater for 
counterfactual versus no counterfactual given higher 
familiarity 
46.90 1 46.90 6.50 0.006 
      
Elaboration of idea generation is greater for 
counterfactual versus no counterfactual given lower 
familiarity 
8.50 1 8.50 1.18 0.280 
      
Panel C: Planned Contrast Interaction of Counterfactual and Example (Analogous to H2)  
      
Lower Familiarity SS df MS F-Statistic p-value 
When familiarity is lower the provision of an 
example will result in the greatest elaboration (+3) 
versus providing no intervention (-1), a 
counterfactual mindset prompt in isolation (-1), or 
both prompts together (-1). 
201.05 1 201.05 27.84 <0.001 
      
Higher Familiarity SS df MS F-Statistic p-value 
When familiarity is higher the provision of an 
example (-1) will result in greater elaboration versus 
providing no intervention (-3) and prompting a 
counterfactual mindset will result in the greatest 
originality regardless of example presence (+2) or 
absence (+2). 
168.52 1 168.52 23.34 <0.001 
      
Notes: 
Reported p-values are two-tailed unless testing a one-tailed prediction, as signified in bold face. 
a I measure the elaboration, or the degree of specification of the audit evidence ideas generated, as the sum of the 
number of points awarded as independently coded by the author and a second coder. 
b Task = task contained lower familiarity (school bus) versus higher familiarity (toll booth), manipulated between 
subjects 
c Counterfactual Mindset = counterfactual mindset prime versus no counterfactual mindset prime, manipulated 
between subjects 
d Example = example audit evidence was present verses absent, manipulated between subjects 
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APPENDIX A: LIST OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FROM STUDY 1 
Primary Questions 
 
1. Can you describe for me a time when you were auditing an area or a transaction and it was 
very easy for you to determine whether you had collected sufficient information to conclude? 
 
2. Can you describe for me a time when you were auditing an area or a transaction and it was 
very difficult for you to determine whether you had collected sufficient information to 
conclude? 
 
3. In addition to anything you noted in the paper questions, were there any other key differences 
between the two situations that made it easier or harder to know when sufficient evidence 
had been collected? 
 
4. Can you think of a situation in which two individual auditors possessing the same amount 
and type of evidence might make different judgments about whether this evidence was 
sufficient? 
 
5. Can you describe for me a time when client management initially presented you with support 
for an accounting transaction and you sought out additional evidence?  
 
6. Suppose you are told that an auditor did not collect sufficient audit evidence. What are the 
most likely reasons for this? 
 
7. How would you describe the process of collecting and reviewing evidence for 
new/unusual/non-routine transactions? For example, would you typically request one piece 
of evidence at a time? 
 
Supplemental Questions 
 
1. Do you use different criteria to assess the sufficiency of audit evidence when acting as a 
reviewer as opposed to when you are the preparer?  
 
a. If so, what are the major differences? Why do you choose this approach? 
 
b. What queues might you look for that indicate enough evidence has been collected? Do 
you do this actively (conscious objective of the review)? 
 
c. What cues might you look for that indicate enough evidence has not been collected? Do 
you do this actively (conscious objective of the review)? 
 
2. Are there any “rules of thumb” that you use in general to determine when you have collected 
enough evidence? 
 
a. Are there times when these general rules are not appropriate? When? How so? 
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3. Can you think of any situations when collecting additional audit evidence might lead to a 
lower quality conclusion? 
 
4. Describe each stopping rule and ask if the participant can recall a time that he or she used 
that type of rule in the field. 
 
a. Magnitude threshold - A person’s belief about the sufficiency of evidence must reach a 
predetermined threshold before he or she will stop gathering information. 
 
b. Mental list – The decision maker creates a criteria set or mental list, when all items 
satisfied he or she stops collecting additional information. 
 
c. Difference threshold - The decision maker assesses the incremental value of the most 
recent piece of information acquired and stops when no longer learning anything new. 
 
d. Representational stability - The decision maker creates a mental model of the 
task/situation as evidence is collected, when new information no longer causes changes to 
the model then information collection ceases. 
 
 
Note 1: The order of questions above is not indicative of the order in which questions were 
asked during the interview sessions. The interviewer randomized Primary Question 1 and 
Primary Question 2 by participant as to which scenario (easy vs. difficult) the participant 
described first. Participants provided demographic information between describing scenarios. 
 
Note 2: Interviews performed were semi-structured in nature such that the questions above were 
meant to guide the conversation rather than dictate the discussion points. As such, participants 
may not have answered every question and the interviewer interjected additional follow-up 
questions as necessary depending on the topics brought up by the participant within their initial 
response. 
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APPENDIX B: SURVEY MATERIALS FROM STUDY 1 
Please take a moment to read the following questions and respond by placing an “x” along the scales 
provided in order to indicate your response. Recall the situation you just described in which it was very 
easy (difficult) for you to determine whether sufficient evidence had been collected in order to conclude. 
Please characterize this situation based on the various features of an audit task (or audit engagement) 
provided below. 
 
1. How routine was this transaction for the client being audited? 
 
 
 
2. How much personal experience did you have with auditing transactions like this? 
 
 
 
3. To what degree was the applicable accounting guidance unambiguous in that it clearly indicated one correct 
accounting treatment as opposed to allowing multiple possibly correct methods of accounting? 
 
 
 
4. How much professional judgment was required to execute the audit program procedures surrounding this 
transaction? 
 
 
 
5. On average, how subjective or objective was the evidence that you were reviewing? 
 
 
 
6. For any evidence prepared by other members of your firm, on average what was their level of expertise for 
this type of transaction? 
 
 
  
|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
0               1               2               3              4               5               6              7               8              9              10
Routine Non-routine
Neither routine 
nor non-routine
|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
No experience
Extensive 
experienceModerate 
experience
0               1               2               3              4               5               6              7               8              9              10
|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
Extremely 
unambiguous
Extremely 
ambiguous
Neither ambiguous 
nor unambiguous
0               1               2               3              4               5               6              7               8              9              10
No prof. 
judgment used
Extensive prof. 
judgment used
Moderate prof. 
judgment used
|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
0               1               2               3              4               5               6              7               8              9              10
Entirely 
objective
Entirely 
subjective
Equally subjective 
and objective
|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
0               1               2               3              4               5               6              7               8              9              10
No 
expertise
Nationally 
recognized expert
Moderate level of 
expertise
|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
0               1               2               3              4               5               6              7               8              9              10
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7. To what extent did you personally request and obtain supporting evidence for the transaction/issue? 
 
 
 
8. To what extent was the evidence reviewed as support for the transaction offered by management as 
opposed to being received in response to audit team requests for evidence? 
 
 
 
9. To what extent did management express a preferred accounting treatment that either agreed or disagreed 
with the initial position of your firm? 
 
 
 
10. How similar was the final working paper to the prior year’s working paper? 
 
 
 
11. What was the status of the engagement’s budget at the time when this issue was reviewed? 
 
 
 
12. How would you characterize the relationship of the audit team with the main client contacts? 
 
 
Collected all 
personally
Collected none 
personally
Collected half 
personally
|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
0               1               2               3              4               5               6              7               8              9              10
Audit team 
requested all
Management 
offered all
Equally requested 
and offered
|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
0               1               2               3              4               5               6              7               8              9              10
Mgmt preference 
agreed with 
auditor
Mgmt preference 
conflicted with 
auditor
Mgmt expressed 
no preference
|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
0               1               2               3              4               5               6              7               8              9              10
Identical to 
PY
No resemblance 
to PY
Moderately 
similar to PY
|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
0               1               2               3              4               5               6              7               8              9              10
Extremely 
under-budget
Extremely 
over-budgetOn budget
|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
0               1               2               3              4               5               6              7               8              9              10
Tense and 
mistrustful
Amicable and 
trustingAmbivalent
|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
0               1               2               3              4               5               6              7               8              9              10
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APPENDIX C: EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS FROM STUDY 2 
 
Letter of Information and Informed Consent 
 
The purpose of this research study is to better understand how auditors make professional judgments. 
Your professional experience makes you an ideal candidate to participate in this study. Your participation 
in this study will take no longer than 40 minutes of your time.   
 
Your participation in this study will involve a brief thought exercise followed by reading a case regarding 
a hypothetical audit client. After reading the case, you will be asked to respond to questions regarding 
audit procedures that you and your hypothetical team are performing and the judgments you would make 
in the described scenario. 
 
Your decision to participate is completely voluntary and you may withdraw from this study at any time 
without any consequences. While we hope you will be able to answer all questions, you are free to decline 
to answer any or all questions. You are assumed to have given consent to participate in this study by 
responding to the questions and returning the completed case to the researchers administering the study. If 
you decide not to participate, then you may keep the case for your records. Please keep this letter of 
information and informed consent for your records.    
 
We will not request information about your identity or the identity of your firm, and thus your 
participation is anonymous. All responses will be entered into a database, saved electronically on secure 
computers that are only accessible by the researchers, and kept in locked storage. The paper and 
electronic data will be kept for a period of, at least, five years. The results of this study will be reported in 
aggregate form, but we might decide to anonymously quote some responses as an illustration of the 
professional judgments auditors make. These quotes will not be associated in any way with individual 
participants. 
 
Only the listed researchers will have access to the data during the study. Other researchers may request to 
view the data later, but they will not know your identity and will not be permitted to publish individual 
responses. 
 
If you would like further information about the study, please contact Dr. Mark Peecher. If you have any 
questions about your rights as a participant in this study or any concerns or complaints, please contact the 
University of Illinois Institutional Review Board at 217-333-2670 (collect calls will be accepted if you 
identify yourself as a research participant) or via email at irb@illinois.edu. If you have any questions 
about your or YOUR FIRM’s participation in this study, please contact FIRM CONTACT NAME HERE 
IF YOU WANT or via email at email goes here. 
 
Thank you in advance for your valuable time. 
 
Mark Peecher PhD, Professor 
Department of Accountancy 
University of Illinois    
peecher@illinois.edu 
(217)-333-4542 
 
Elizabeth Altiero, Doctoral Student 
Department of Accountancy 
University of Illinois 
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General Case Instructions 
   
 
 
1. There are three parts to this case.  Please read the instructions for each part 
carefully, and then provide your answers to several questions that follow.  
 
2. Please consider your answers carefully before submitting them, as you will not be 
able to go back and make changes once they have been submitted for research 
purposes.  
 
3. The researchers acknowledge that the information provided in the cases is 
considerably less than what you normally would have available during an audit.  
Nevertheless, we are interested in your best professional judgment given the 
available information.  Please note that there are no single right answers to the 
audit case questions.   
 
4. Thank you for your participation.  
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PART 1 
   
 
You will first complete a brief thought exercise before proceeding 
to the audit task. Please read the instructions carefully and respond 
in the space provided. 
110 
Part 1: Thought Exercise 
Jane is at a rock concert of one of her favorite bands. Seating is on a first come, first served basis. At the 
concert the announcer reveals that a trip to Hawaii will be given to a lucky fan and that the winner will be 
determined by the seat number currently occupied. [CF Add: Jane’s view of the stage is partially 
obstructed and she sees a much better seat in the near vicinity so she changes seats.] The announcer 
returns just prior to the start of the concert to announce the winner of the trip to Hawaii. To Jane’s 
surprise the announcer calls the number of the seat she [No CF: is sitting in/CF: just moved to] and she 
wins the trip to Hawaii. 
 
In the space provided below please write down some examples of thoughts that might run through 
Jane’s head after the concert: 
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PART 2 
   
 
Please assume that you are the supervising senior on the client 
described in the following case. This task will start by providing 
you with information regarding a hypothetical audit client. Please 
read this information carefully and respond to the subsequent 
questions in the spaces provided. 
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Part 2: Audit Task 
[CASE 1] The client is a well-known technology company that often asks job applicants very challenging 
interview questions. One of these questions asks the applicants, “How many golf balls would fit inside a 
school bus?” 
 
The legal department of this company is concerned that disgruntled applicants could sue the company if 
they feel their answers are incorrectly dismissed. Therefore, the lawyers of the firm required that the 
company purchase a school bus and fill it with golf balls when they started using this question in 
interviews. Your firm has been engaged to attest as to the number of golf balls currently held inside the 
school bus. 
 
Your task is to create an audit plan for this engagement by identifying audit evidence you could obtain 
and audit procedures that you could perform in order to get assurance over the number of golf balls in the 
school bus.  
 
[Example Condition Add: For example, obtain the dimensions of the school bus and use that information 
in an analytical procedure to estimate the number of golf balls that the bus can hold.] 
 
[CASE 2] The client is a well-known construction company that is diversifying its operations. In the past 
year this company purchased a toll bridge that was previously owned and operated by a smaller private 
company. Toll bridge operations are not an area in which this company has experience, so these 
operations are completely new to the current year audit.  
 
Your firm has been engaged to attest to the post acquisition financial statements of this company. More 
specifically, you have been assigned to work on the toll bridge business segment exclusively. 
 
Your task is to create an audit plan for this engagement by identifying audit evidence you could obtain 
and audit procedures that you could perform in order to get assurance over the revenues associated with 
the toll bridge’s operations.  
 
[Example Condition Add: For example, obtain data on average daily traffic flow across the bridge and 
use that information in an analytical procedure to estimate the expected annual revenues.] 
 
Please proceed to the following page to record your responses. 
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1. What evidence items could you collect and what audit procedures could you perform to 
complete this engagement?  
 
Please take your time to think of as many ideas as possible. Later you will be using the items listed 
here to create an audit program so it will be important to have sufficient items to choose from. 
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2.  Using your responses to Question 1 above, please refine your thoughts into a cohesive audit 
program that you would recommend using for this engagement. Write this audit program at a 
level of detail and specificity such that you would expect a staff on your engagement to be able to 
execute it. Where necessary, please explain any assumptions that you make. 
 
If you wish to include additional procedures or evidence items that were not included in your 
response to Question 1 feel free to do so. However, please do NOT go back and modify your 
responses to Question 1. 
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3. Please answer the following questions about the program you described on the previous page by 
placing an “X” on the scale provided. 
 
a. To what extent do you believe that testing in accordance with your audit program would provide 
reasonable assurance? 
 
  
 
b. To what extend do you believe that testing in accordance with your audit program would provide 
limited assurance? 
 
 
 
 
 
c. What is the likelihood that your audit program would identify a material misstatement if one 
exists? 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Approximately how many total chargeable hours of your time would be required for you to 
perform the audit program steps specified on the previous page? 
  
  Number of Hours: _____________________ 
 
  
2 3 4 5 61 7
Might provide 
reasonable 
assurance
Definitely does 
NOT provide 
reasonable 
assurance
Definitely 
provides 
reasonable 
assurance
8 9
2 3 4 5 61 7
Might provide 
limited 
assurance
Definitely does 
NOT provide 
limited 
assurance
Definitely 
provides 
limited 
assurance
8 9
2 3 4 5 61 7
Approximately 
half of the time
Almost 
never
Almost 
always
8 9
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5. Place an X on the scale provided for each of the following items.  To what extent are the 
following words characteristic of your current mental state: 
 
a. Creative 
 
 
 
 
b. Analytic 
 
 
 
 
c. Open 
 
 
 
 
d. Happy 
 
 
 
 
e. Critical 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 3 4 5 61 7
Moderately 
characteristic
Not at all 
characteristic
Very 
characteristic
8 9
2 3 4 5 61 7
Moderately 
characteristic
Not at all 
characteristic
Very 
characteristic
8 9
2 3 4 5 61 7
Moderately 
characteristic
Not at all 
characteristic
Very 
characteristic
8 9
2 3 4 5 61 7
Moderately 
characteristic
Not at all 
characteristic
Very 
characteristic
8 9
2 3 4 5 61 7
Moderately 
characteristic
Not at all 
characteristic
Very 
characteristic
8 9
117 
f. Focused 
 
 
 
 
g. Thorough 
 
 
 
 
h. Smart 
 
 
 
 
i. Inclusive 
 
 
 
 
j. Mood 
 
 
  
2 3 4 5 61 7
Moderately 
characteristic
Not at all 
characteristic
Very 
characteristic
8 9
2 3 4 5 61 7
Moderately 
characteristic
Not at all 
characteristic
Very 
characteristic
8 9
2 3 4 5 61 7
Moderately 
characteristic
Not at all 
characteristic
Very 
characteristic
8 9
2 3 4 5 61 7
Moderately 
characteristic
Not at all 
characteristic
Very 
characteristic
8 9
2 3 4 5 61 7
Neither positive 
nor negativeVery negative Very positive
8 9
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You have completed Parts 1 and 2.  
Please place this packet into Envelope 1. 
 
Only one more part to go! 
Continue the experiment by opening Envelope 2. 
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PART 3 
   
 
In this section you will review a brief audit case for a hypothetical 
audit client and modify an existing audit program for that client’s 
investment account. 
 
Following the audit case you will be asked some general questions 
about your professional experiences. Please answer all questions to 
the best of your ability. 
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Part 3(A): Brief Audit Case 
ABC, Inc. is a mid-sized manufacturing client. You are reviewing a potential audit program for the 
investments account of this client. The company has an effective control environment and its investment 
portfolio primarily consists of bond and mutual fund holdings. 
 
Please review each audit procedure below and indicate whether or not you would include the procedure in 
the audit program. Space has also been provided for you to indicate any additional procedures not 
included on this list that you would add to the audit program. 
 
Investments Account – Audit Program 
Audit Procedure 
Include Procedure in Current 
Year Audit Program? 
(Circle Yes or No) 
1. Perform an analytical review to compare current year investment 
account balances with prior year’s balances. Yes / No 
2. Examine broker’s advices for a sample of securities purchased 
during the year. Yes / No 
3. Search for purchases of securities by examining transactions for a 
few days after year-end. Yes / No 
4. Review brokers’ invoices for cost basis of securities purchased. 
 Yes / No 
5. Determine basis for valuing investments by tracing values to 
published quotations for marketable securities. Yes / No 
6. Determine whether there has been any permanent impairment in 
the value of the cost basis of an individual security. Yes / No 
7. Send portfolio information to audit firm valuation specialists for 
independent verification. Yes / No 
8. Obtain listing of investments by category (held-to-maturity, 
trading, and available-for-sale); foot listing and agree totals to 
securities register and general ledger. 
Yes / No 
9.    
 
 
 
Yes 
10.    
 
 
 
Yes 
11.    
 
 
 
Yes 
12.    
 
 
 
Yes 
13.   
 
 
 
Yes 
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Please answer the following questions related to the task you completed on the previous page. 
 
1. Prior to any changes you made, how would you rate the effectiveness of the eight-step audit program 
provided? 
 
 
 
 
2. Prior to any changes you made, how would you rate the completeness of the eight-step audit 
program provided? 
 
 
 
 
3. Prior to any changes you made, how would you rate the efficiency of the eight-step audit program 
provided? 
 
 
 
 
4. After any changes you made, how would you rate the effectiveness of the modified audit program? 
 
 
 
 
5. After any changes you made, how would you rate the completeness of the modified audit program? 
 
 
 
 
6. After any changes you made, how would you rate the efficiency of the modified audit program? 
 
  
2 3 4 5 61 7
Same as 
average
Much worse 
than average
Much better 
than average
8 9
2 3 4 5 61 7
Same as 
average
Much worse 
than average
Much better 
than average
8 9
2 3 4 5 61 7
Same as 
average
Much worse 
than average
Much better 
than average
8 9
2 3 4 5 61 7
Same as 
average
Much worse 
than average
Much better 
than average
8 9
2 3 4 5 61 7
Same as 
average
Much worse 
than average
Much better 
than average
8 9
2 3 4 5 61 7
Same as 
average
Much worse 
than average
Much better 
than average
8 9
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Part 3 (B): General Questions 
 
Please answer the following questions by placing an “X” next to the best answer. 
 
1. In the story you read about Jane attending a rock concert, Jane switched seats just before winning the 
trip to Hawaii. 
 
 __________ True 
 
 __________ False 
 
 
2. The instructions preceding the audit task included the following example audit procedure and related 
evidence: [SB: Obtain the dimensions of the school bus and use that information in an analytical 
procedure to estimate the number of golf balls that the bus can hold./TB: Obtain data on average 
daily traffic flow across the bridge and use that information in an analytical procedure to estimate 
the expected annual revenues.] 
 
 __________ True 
 
 __________ False 
 
 
Please answer the following questions by placing an “X” on the scale provided 
 
3. I feel confident about my performance on the audit task contained in these materials. 
 
 
 
4. In general, I am confident in my ability to make valuable modifications to the audit program when 
necessary. 
 
 
 
5. I found this task interesting and engaging. 
 
 
 
 
 
2 3 4 5 61 7
Neither agree
nor disagree
Strongly
disagree
Strongly
agree
8 9
2 3 4 5 61 7
Neither agree
nor disagree
Strongly
disagree
Strongly
agree
8 9
2 3 4 5 61 7
Neither agree
nor disagree
Strongly
disagree
Strongly
agree
8 9
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6. In general, I find designing new audit procedures interesting and engaging. 
 
 
 
 
7. To what extent to you agree with the following statement: I often encounter situations in which I must 
modify an existing audit program. 
 
 
 
  
8. How much experience do you have in designing or modifying audit procedures? 
 
 
 
 
9. For audit procedures you have designed or modified in the past, to what extent do you believe that 
they added value to the audit? 
 
 
 
 
10. How many months of audit experience do you have? 
 
  
 Number of months:                                          
 
 
 
11. What is your industry of specialization? (If you do not have a designated industry of specialization 
respond please respond “N/A.”) 
 
  
 ________________________________________________________ 
 
 
  
2 3 4 5 61 7
Neither agree
nor disagree
Strongly
disagree
Strongly
agree
8 9
2 3 4 5 61 7
Moderate 
extent
Very little 
extent
Very great 
extent
8 9
2 3 4 5 61 7
Moderate 
experience
No 
experience
Extensive 
experience
8 9
2 3 4 5 61 7
Moderate 
extent
Very little 
extent
Very great 
extent
8 9
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12. What is the most creative audit procedure you have ever designed or witnessed during your 
time as an auditor? Please describe briefly below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Almost done! For the final four questions, please think about the experiences that you have 
had with current and former clients. 
 
1. Which members of management have had responsibility for making asset impairment 
decisions, for accounting purposes? (Check all that apply.) 
 
__________CEO   
 
__________CFO  
 
__________COO 
 
__________Other (please specify)_________________ 
 
 
2. Which members of management have had responsibility for making future capital investment 
decisions? (Check all that apply.) 
 
__________CEO 
 
__________CFO 
 
__________COO 
 
__________Other (please specify)_________________ 
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3. In your experience, how common is it for the same member of management to have 
responsibility for BOTH an asset impairment decision as well as future capital investment 
decisions related to that asset? 
 
 
 
4. In your experience, how subjective are management impairment decisions? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU FOR PARTICIPATING! 
Please return all materials to the last envelope and return the 
entire packet to the experiment administrator. 
 
 
20 30 40 50 6010 70
Not common
 at all
Very 
common
0 1009080
20 30 40 50 6010 70
Not at all: There is 
very little 
subjective 
judgment in 
impairment 
decisions
0 1009080
Very much: There 
is quite a bit of 
subjective 
judgment in 
impairment 
decisions 
